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INTRODUCTION  
Shareholders have long complained that top executives are overpaid by 
corporate boards irrespective of their performance.
1
 Traditionally largely 
powerless to prevent these perceived abuses, investors have sought a way 
to gain greater influence over directors’ compensation decisions. While 
many governments responded by increasing the level of corporate 
disclosures on compensation packages and policies, and occasionally 
tinkering with tax policies in efforts to reduce pay levels, none of these 
changes has had much impact.
2
  
However, investors have continued to put pressure on governments to 
change the status quo. In 2002, these efforts led the U.K. to adopt 
legislation requiring public companies to permit their shareholders to have 
a mandatory, nonbinding vote on the compensation of their top executives 
(“Say on Pay”).3 Since that time, there has been a wave of Say on Pay 
legislation enacted in countries around the world, including the U.S., 
Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, with Swiss voters most 
recently approving a binding shareholder vote on executive remuneration.
4
 
In this Article, we examine these new legislative iniatives carefully and 
ask why they have been so widely adopted, how effective they are, and 
whether they are likely to be adopted in other countries.
5
 
 
 
 1. Examples of these complaints are mentioned throughout LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, 
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
For a conflicting view, see John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO 
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005).  
 2. In fact, some commentators claim that these regulatory initiatives have generally been 
ineffective or counterproductive. Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of 
Executive Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 11, 11 (Randall S. Thomas & 
Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012). 
 3. Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from 
the U.K., 17 REV. OF FIN. 527 (2013). For an early article debating the merits of Say on Pay that 
preceded the U.K. adoption, see Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a 
Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 277 (2001). 
 4. The Swiss Parliament enacted the law on November 20, 2013, which came into force on 
January 1, 2014 but contains a long transition term. Press Release, Der Bundesrat, Eidgenössisches 
Justiz- und Polizeidepartement EJPD, Umsetzung der Abzocker-Initiative: Verordnung tritt am 1. 
Januar 2014 in Kraft (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/de/home/ dokumentation/ 
mi/2013/2013-11-20.html. Swiss voters did, however, reject proposed caps that would have limited 
executive pay to twelve times that of the lowest paid worker. Jack Ewing, Swiss Voters Decisively 
Reject a Measure to Put Limits on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/business/swiss-reject-measure-to-curb-executive-pay.html?_r=0.  
 5. We are more precise about these issues than some other recent empirical studies. See, e.g., 
Riccardo Correa & Ugur Lel, Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Value 
Around the World (Working Paper 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2243921 (incorrectly claiming that Switzerland had adopted Say on Pay legislation as of 
June 2013); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in 2 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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What is the justification for adopting these rules? The answer to this 
question turns in large part on the prevailing share ownership structure of 
corporations in the country in question. For countries where most 
corporations have dispersed ownership structures, like the U.S., the U.K. 
and Australia, proponents have claimed that these votes will allow 
shareholders to monitor management and thereby reduce the agency costs 
of the separation of ownership and control in public companies.
6
 
Advocates argued that institutional investors, assisted by third-party voting 
advisors, would overcome collective action problems, inform themselves 
about corporate performance and intelligently evaluate the executive pay 
packages being proposed by corporate boards. Boards would, in turn, 
respond by better engaging with their investors and providing them with 
more information, tie executive pay more closely to performance and 
show greater restraint in the compensation awards.
7
 Opponents of Say on 
Pay denied that any of these possible benefits would result and instead 
claimed that the entire effort was misplaced.
8
  
In concentrated ownership countries,
9
 such as the Netherlands, 
Germany, Sweden, and Belgium, the story is more nuanced. The existence 
of controlling shareholders at most companies in these countries means 
that there already is close monitoring of executive pay levels by a 
motivated owner.
10
 Thus, at first blush, there seems to be little reason for 
these countries to have adopted Say on Pay voting requirements. However, 
on closer examination, we find several other reasons for these changes, 
including: increased ownership dispersion at larger public companies 
creating a need for a new monitor of executive pay; strong support of such 
legislation by foreign institutional investors whose ownership interests in 
EU-based firms has increased dramatically in recent years; social 
 
 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211, 211 (George Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene 
Stulz eds., 2012) (incorrectly stating that France has enacted a binding Say on Pay vote). 
 6. Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It 
Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1232 
(2012)  
 7. Id. at 1231–33. 
 8. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, 32 REG. 42 (2009).  
 9. By concentrated ownership countries, we mean jurisdictions in which most public firms have 
controlling shareholders or control groups. Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay 
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1196 (2004) (“In most foreign 
countries, stock ownership is much more concentrated than in the United States, and many firms are 
controlled by majority shareholders.”). For a more complete discussion in the context of Europe, see 
THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001). 
 10. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse Fried & David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 839–40 (2002); Thomas, supra note 9, 
at 1196 (arguing that international pay gap rests on market driven factors). 
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pressures against rising levels of income inequality; political responses by 
left-leaning parties to these social pressures by the introduction of Say on 
Pay legislation; and the presence of important state-owned enterprises in 
some of these countries that give politicians an important role in setting 
executive pay.  
The effects of Say on Pay votes are harder to summarize because they 
vary across nations. However, several general statements can be made. 
First, when Say on Pay votes are held, shareholders vote to approve the 
pay levels, pay composition, and pay policies, at almost all companies by 
very wide margins. Second, third-party voting advisors, such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), pay a crucial role in informing 
institutional investors about executive compensation practices and 
packages. These advisors’ recommendations for, or against, a company’s 
pay plan may also carry significant weight with their institutional clients, 
and can dramatically impact the outcome of a vote. Third, Say on Pay’s 
strongest effect has been felt at companies that exhibit poor performance 
with relatively high levels of pay.
11
 Fourth, when companies receive low 
levels of shareholder support in a vote, directors frequently contact their 
investors to better explain their policies, thereby giving shareholders 
greater input into pay issues. Fifth, Say on Pay votes appear to have had 
little long-term impact on executive pay levels, while research on their 
impact on shareholder value tends to show a small positive impact, 
although some studies find no, or negative, effects. 
Overall, we conclude that Say on Pay is here to stay. In fact, if the 
recent experience of the Swiss popular referendum in favor of a binding 
vote on executive compensation is any gauge, then it seems likely to 
appear in more countries over time. Thus, in the final Part of this Article, 
we look at the future of Say on Pay. We hypothesize that if boards 
continue to increase pay levels over time, then countries with advisory 
votes will move to make them binding votes. This already has been the 
case in the U.K. and Australia. Moreover, some legislatures will feel it 
necessary to impose hard-law regulations on compensation practices, 
either directly on pay levels and composition as the EU already did and is 
further threatening to do for banks,
12
 or indirectly as the Australians have 
 
 
 11. Correa & Lel, supra note 5, at 14.  
 12. See Council Directive 2013/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Council Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 92–94, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 386–89 (EU).  
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done by attaching severe consequences to boards’ failure to respond to 
repeated high levels of shareholder dissent in Say on Pay votes.
13
  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we provide an overview of 
the current state of Say on Pay in the U.S., U.K., Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. Part II distills the 
experiences of these nations to develop a set of explanatory factors for 
why Say on Pay legislation has been adopted, or seems likely to be 
adopted, in these countries. The final Part of this Article contains our 
predictions about the future of Say on Pay in these and other countries.  
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAY ON PAY REGIMES: LEGAL RULES AND 
VOTING OUTCOMES  
While Say on Pay has been the topic of several empirical studies at 
both the national and international level, many of these papers do not 
clearly define Say on Pay. This is important because different kinds of 
shareholder votes coexist and it is a serious mistake to treat them all as 
equivalent.
14
 In our study, we define Say on Pay as: (1) a recurring, 
mandatory,
15
 (2) binding or advisory shareholders’ vote, (3) provided by 
law,
16
 that (4) directly or indirectly through the approval of the 
remuneration system, remuneration report or remuneration policy, 
(5) governs the individual or collective global remuneration package of the 
executives or managing directors of the corporation.
17
 As we will see, not 
all countries that permit shareholder votes on executive remuneration 
issues provide those investors with a Say on Pay vote. 
We begin with a detailed discussion of the Say on Pay regimes 
adopted, or proposed, in eight of the most important industrialized 
countries in the world: the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. While there has been some 
 
 
 13. See infra Part I.C for further discussion of the Australian rules on Say on Pay. 
 14. One recent study correctly identified eleven European countries with some kind of Say on 
Pay regulations. See Roberto Barontini, Stefano Bozzi, Guido Ferrarini & Maria-Cristina Ungureanu, 
Directors’ Remuneration Before and After the Crisis: Measuring the Impact of Reforms in Europe, in 
BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES 251, tbl.1 (2013). However, Correa 
and Lel included only six of these countries in their empirical analysis of Say on Pay. Correa & Lel, 
supra note 5, at tbl.1.  
 15. Our definition excludes legal provisions that give companies the option of providing 
shareholders a vote on the remuneration of directors (as is the case in Germany). 
 16. This means that we exclude a shareholder vote that might be undertaken as the result of a 
Comply or Explain corporate governance code (even if mandatory), which is not law (as is the case in 
France). 
 17. Under our definition, shareholder approval of only a part of the executive’s remuneration 
package, like the granting of stock options, is not a Say on Pay vote.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/7
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research conducted in the first three countries mentioned, almost nothing 
has been written about the experiences of the Continental European 
countries.
18
 As a result, much of the statistical evidence that we report on 
these five countries is derived from data that we have hand collected and 
put into tables.  
A. Say on Pay in the U.S. 
1. Development  
Say on Pay in the U.S. grew out of precatory shareholder-sponsored 
Rule 14a-8
19
 proposals submitted to public companies for inclusion on 
their proxy statements.
20
 Beginning in the 2006 proxy season, the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) started submitting these proposals, which recommended that 
the corporate boards at the targeted companies give shareholders a 
nonbinding vote on the companies’ pay for their top executives.21  
These early Say on Pay shareholder proposals were uniformly opposed 
by management but received significant shareholder support.
22
 
Management argued that the board of directors, not shareholders, was 
responsible for setting executive compensation. In their eyes, shareholder 
input would only impede the board’s ability to act effectively. Initially, 
boards ignored Say on Pay proposals—even those supported by a majority 
of shareholders.
23
 
In 2008, in response to public concerns about the financial crisis, 
Congress put Say on Pay on its legislative agenda. The Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) required Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) fund recipients to provide their shareholders with 
 
 
 18. A notable exception is the comparative work in Barontini et al., supra note 14 (providing 
both empirical data on the development of executive pay in large European companies and the general 
state of the art on Say on Pay rules in European countries).  
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 20. Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1218. 
 21. Charles Nathan, “Say on Pay” Shareholder Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation: The 
New Frontier of Corporate Governance Activism, LATHAM & WATKINS M&A COMMENT. (Nov. 
2007), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2039_1.pdf. See also Sandeep Gopalan, Say on 
Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 
220–21 (2008).  
 22. Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1219–20. 
 23. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1012 (2010). 
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an advisory vote on the pay for the company’s executives.24 In 2009, the 
financial stimulus plan continued the Say on Pay requirement for financial 
firms with outstanding TARP debts.
25
  
To implement this new legislation in 2009, the SEC required an 
advisory shareholder vote on executive pay packages of TARP 
recipients.
26
 During the 2010 proxy season, about 280 financial firms held 
Say on Pay votes.
27
 The EESA mandate increased the number of firms 
subject to advisory Say on Pay votes beyond those shareholders identified 
as having “bad” compensation.28  
The 2010 proxy season saw shareholders at TARP-funded firms vote in 
support of management-sponsored Say on Pay proposals with an average 
support level of 88.7%.
29
 This high level of shareholder support for 
executive pay policies is interesting since in 2010 most of the Say on Pay 
votes were held at financial firms that had fared poorly during the financial 
crisis.  
2. Dodd–Frank Requirements 
Advisory Say on Pay for top executives’ compensation was made 
universal for public companies by section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
30
 
Under section 951, the SEC provided detailed requirements that identify 
both the form of the Say on Pay proposal and the executive officers whose 
compensation is subject to a shareholder vote.
31
 Say on Pay votes are now 
 
 
 24. The Troubled Asset Relief Program, established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008 (EESA), required that companies with outstanding funds provide an advisory vote to their 
shareholders. See EESA, Pub.L. 110-343, § 111(a), (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2008)).  
 25. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, while amending some aspects of 
EESA, left intact the “say on pay” requirements. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 517 (2009). Thus, 
financial companies with outstanding TARP funds are required to submit executive pay to a 
shareholder vote under both TARP and Dodd–Frank. The SEC has made clear that only one vote, 
however, is necessary to satisfy both statutory requirements. See SEC Final Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 
240, 249 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf (vote under EESA is 
“effectively” the same as required by Dodd–Frank). Given that TARP recipients are required to 
conduct a “say on pay” vote annually, the SEC has exempted them from a vote on the frequency of 
“say on pay.” See id. at 57–58.  
 26. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, 17 C.F.R. § 240 
(2010) (adopting Rule 14a-20 to require TARP recipients to provide a separate non-binding 
shareholder vote to approve compensation of executives whenever shareholders vote at an annual 
meeting involving election of directors). 
 27. Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1223. 
 28. Id. at 1224. 
 29. Id. at tbl.2. 
 30. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010). 
 31. Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1225. 
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required at shareholder meetings held after January 21, 2011 at public 
companies with a $75 million public equity float or more.
32
  
Only the pay packages of a company’s executive officers named in the 
company’s proxy compensation table are subjected to the vote.33 The vote 
is up or down as to the overall compensation package as described in the 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) section of the proxy 
statement,
34
 and does not allow shareholders to directly voice an opinion 
on specific elements of executive compensation (such as bonuses, stock 
options, retirement pay, performance incentives).
35
  
3. Impact of Say on Pay 
In the 2011 proxy season, shareholders voted on these management 
proposals at about 2200 US public companies.
36
 The results showed 
several clear trends. First, shareholders strongly supported existing pay 
practices at most firms with Say on Pay votes garnering on average 91.2% 
support. Second, management proposals were voted down only 1.6% of 
the time,
37
 and when that happened it was often based on by pay-for-
performance concerns. Third, shareholder votes were highly correlated to 
company share returns and CEO pay, with low returns and high CEO pay 
resulting in lower Say on Pay support. Fourth, negative Say on Pay 
recommendations by third-party voting advisors prompted many 
 
 
 32. SEC Final Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(b) (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/2011/33-9178.pdf. Smaller reporting companies become subject to the Say on Pay voting 
requirement for annual meetings after January 21, 2013. Id. 
 33. See id. § 240.14a-21(a) (“say on pay” vote required at annual shareholder meetings at which 
directors are elected for named executives whose compensation is disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of 
Regulation S-K). The compensation of directors is not subject to a mandatory “say on pay” vote. See 
id.  
 34. The SEC rule does not require that the management-submitted “say on pay” proposal be 
phrased in a particular way, though it must indicate that the proposal seeks a shareholder vote “to 
approve the compensation of executives as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K.” Id. at 
19 (quotations and alterations omitted). A suggested proposal calls on shareholders to approve 
“compensation paid . . . as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis, compensation tables and narrative discussion.” Id. at 19 n.68. 
A vote to approve only compensation policies and procedures would not pass muster. Id. at 19–20.  
 35. See id. § 240.14a-21(a). In addition, the SEC added a comment to Rule 14a-8 that companies 
will be allowed to exclude shareholder-submitted proposals under the rule if the shareholder proposes 
a “say on pay” vote with “substantially the same scope the say-on-pay vote required by Rule 14a-21(a) 
. . . .” Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 44–45.  
 36. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 2. (updated Aug. 8, 
2011). Equilar, a leading provider of data on executive pay, counted 2252 from the Russell 3000 as of 
June 30, 2011. EQUILAR, AN ANALYSIS OF VOTING RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE AT RUSSELL 3000 
COMPANIES 5 (July 2011), http://www.equilar.com/knowledge-network/research-articles/2011/pdf/ 
Equilar-Voting-Analytics-July2011.pdf.  
 37. Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1248. 
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companies to modify their disclosure filings or to change their pay 
practices (sometimes retroactively) to win support.
38
  
An important question is what effect Say on Pay voting has had on 
shareholder value. Several studies attempt to measure this effect. Cunat, 
Gine and Guadalupe study Rule 14a-8 advisory shareholder proposals 
from 2006 to 2010 that request that companies permit their shareholders to 
vote on executive compensation at the firm.
39
 They examine the immediate 
effect on firm stock market returns as well as longer-term effects on CEO 
compensation, accounting performance, productivity and firm policies. 
They find that on the day of the shareholder vote, if Say on Pay proposals 
receive more than 50% shareholder approval, the company experiences an 
abnormal return of 2.4% relative to one whose vote fails.
40
 This study 
reports that where voting crosses the 50% threshold, there is a 50% higher 
likelihood of being implemented by the firm in question.
41
 Further, firms 
implementing Say on Pay “have higher growth in earnings per share, 
return on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q one year after the vote.”42 
However, they find only small effects on executive compensation with a 
4% reduction in salary increases.
43
 They suggest that Say on Pay “serves 
to monitor and incentivize CEOs to deliver better firm performance by 
providing a clear mechanism for shareholders to voice their opinions, as 
confirmed by major improvements in shareholder value and firm 
performance among the firms in our sample.”44  
Other empirical research looking at the effect of Say on Pay on firm 
value uses event studies. One set of studies examines stock market 
reactions around regulatory events related to enactment of Say on Pay 
requirements. Ferri and Maber find small, positive price reactions to Say 
on Pay regulation in the U.K., particularly in firms with excess pay and 
controversial compensation practices.
45
 There are similar findings as to the 
Congressional adoption of the U.S. Say on Pay legislation, although there 
 
 
 38. Id. at 1256–59. 
 39. Vincente Cunat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm 
Performance (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Fin. Working Paper No. 373), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2240410.  
 40. Id. at 4. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 5–6. By comparison, Cai and Walkling find no stock price reaction to Rule 14a-8 
proposals around the proxy filing dates and annual meeting dates. Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, 
Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299, 329–30 
(2011). 
 45. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 559. 
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is not unanimity on this point.
46
A second set of event studies examines the 
effect of Say on Pay induced compensation changes on stock prices 
finding either no stock price reaction
47
 or small negative effects.
48
 
Another recent study by Iliev and Vitanova examines the 
announcement of the SEC rules that gave smaller firms an additional two 
years before being subjected to the new requirement imposed on larger 
public companies.
49
 They find that the announcement of this rule led to a 
positive 1.5% three day return for firms that were required to hold a Say 
on Pay vote versus those that were not.
50
  
In the eyes of its supporters, Dodd–Frank’s mandated shareholder votes 
have also focused management on shareholders’ concerns, increased 
shareholder participation in corporate governance, and opened lines of 
communication between management and shareholders (and proxy 
advisory firms) regarding executive compensation.
51
 Management at many 
companies made changes to the substance and disclosure of their pay 
programs in an attempt to more clearly align pay to performance.
52
 
Furthermore, many companies revised the content of the CD&A filed with 
the annual meeting proxy materials. At many companies whose pay 
programs received negative Say on Pay recommendations by proxy 
advisory firms, directors connected with shareholders following an 
“against” recommendation.53 Changes in corporate governance behavior—
 
 
 46. See Cai & Walkling, supra note 44, at 312–13 (finding positive and statistically significant 
stock price increase in firm values at companies with high abnormal CEO compensation, or low pay-
for-performance sensitivity, within the three days surrounding the House of Representatives’ passage 
of Say on Pay legislation); but see David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The 
Market Reaction To Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 432 (2011) (Say on 
Pay legislation has an insignificant market reaction). 
 47. Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: 
Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 955 (2013) (no stock price reaction around 
compensation changes made after the vote explicitly in response to Say on Pay votes). 
 48. David F. Larcker, Allen McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, The Economic Consequences of Pay 
Advisor Say-on-Pay Voting Policies 6 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ. 
Working Paper No. 119; Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No. 14-27 (2105R), 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101453 (compensation changes made before the vote 
associated with a negative abnormal return of -0.44%); see also Christopher Armstrong, Ian D. Gow & 
David F. Larcker, The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 
J. ACCT. RES. 909 (2013) (arguing that shareholder votes have little effect on firms’ incentive-
compensation policies). 
 49. Peter Iliev & Svetla Vitanova, The Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the U.S. 3 (Pa. State 
Univ. Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235064.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech to Social Investment Forum 
(June 10, 2011). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
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such as more complete disclosure of pay-for-performance policies and the 
reversal of specific, controversial pay practices—inaugurated by Say on 
Pay in 2011 continued apace in 2012 and 2013.  
B. U.K. Say on Pay  
1. Early Legislation 
Decades of perceived excess executive remuneration and “rewards for 
failure” led to the evolution of Say on Pay legislation in the U.K.54 
Effective August 1, 2002, the U.K. became the first country to adopt 
mandatory nonbinding shareholder votes on director compensation (Say 
on Pay), through the Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) 
Regulations.
55
 In 2003, the first year of mandatory advisory votes in the 
U.K., shareholders at GlaxoSmithKline became the first to vote down their 
company’s compensation report, by the slim margin of 50.72%.56 
Specifically, shareholders objected to an estimated $35 million golden 
parachute for the Philadelphia-based CEO.
57
 Hailing it as a “landmark in 
corporate governance,” “[s]ome British activists think it may mark the 
moment when British capitalism decided to stop converging with its 
American counterpart.”58  
However, in the overwhelming number of cases, shareholders vote in 
favor of management-presented compensation reports. One study suggests 
less than 10% of shareholders abstain from, or vote against, compensation 
reports.
59
 In fact, between 2003 and 2009, only nine companies had their 
Say on Pay proposal defeated, and all but the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
GlaxoSmithKline were relatively small firms.
60
 Furthermore, between 
 
 
 54. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 1. 
 55. Walid M. Alissa, Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of 
Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK 7 (Pennsylvania State University Working Paper May 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412880; STEPHEN DEANE, WHAT 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS SAY ON PAY: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 7 (2005); Ferri & Maber, supra 
note 3, at 1. The regulations become an amendment to the U.K. Companies Act. Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
”Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 342 (2009); Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 301.  
 56. DEANE, supra note 55, at 5. 
 57. Gordon, supra note 55, at 342. 
 58. DEANE, supra note 55, at 5. 
 59. See Martin J. Conyon & Graham V. Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK 5 (Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Labor 
Relations, Compensation Res. Initiative Paper No. 2009-004, 2009), available at http://digital 
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/cri/2. 
 60. Jeremy Ryan Delman, Note, Survey: Structuring Say-on-Pay: A Comparative Look at Global 
Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 583, 610. 
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2002 and 2007, only sixty-four out of 596 reporting companies received 
dissent of more than 20%.
61
 
2. The Effects of Nonbinding Say on Pay in the U.K. 
Since its enactment in 2002, the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
(DRR) regulations have been the subject of much academic scholarship.
62
 
Generally, empirical studies suggest that no change in the executive pay 
growth rate occurred after the adoption of the U.K. regulations.
63
 
However, the “Say on Pay” regulation may have a “moderating effect on 
the level of CEO compensation conditional upon poor performance.”64 
Shareholders dissent more where CEO compensation is above the 
“average excess compensation”65 and where pay is not closely tethered to 
performance.
66
 Studies suggest, however, that a board’s responsiveness to 
such shareholder dissent is mixed.
67
 
Empirical results further show that Say on Pay regulation “was 
accompanied by positive stock price reactions at firms with controversial 
pay practices and, more specifically, practices that weaken penalties for 
poor performance, consistent with investors perceiving say on pay as a 
value-creating governance mechanism.”68 This suggests shareholders view 
the new regulation as a “value enhancing monitoring mechanism.”69 
Even with most reports receiving over a 90% shareholder approval 
rate, compensation reports attract the single highest dissention rate among 
shareholders when contrasted with shareholder voting patterns on any 
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. E.g., Alissa, supra note 55; Mary Ellen Carter & Valentina Zamora, Shareholder 
Remuneration Votes and CEO Compensation Design (AAA 2008 MAS Meeting Paper, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004061; Conyon & Sadler, supra 
note 59; Ferri & Maber, supra note 3; Kym Sheehan, Say on Pay and the Outrage Constraint (The 
Executive Remuneration Reporter Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1679622 (updating 2007 study). 
 63. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 554; see also DEANE, supra note 55, at 9 (“Despite these pay-
for-performance successes, observers in . . . the U.K. . . . note that executive pay levels are still 
ratcheting upward.”). 
 64. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 555. 
 65. See Alissa, supra note 55, at 23 (indicating firms reduce compensation more often when such 
firms are the average excess compensation). 
 66. Carter & Zamora, supra note 62, at 24. 
 67. See Alissa, supra note 55, at 35 (arguing boards are more responsive at levels of above 
average excess compensation); Carter & Zamora, supra note 62, at 23 (acknowledging lag in 
responsiveness). But see Conyon & Sadler, supra note 62, at 29 (“There is little evidence that 
shareholder say on pay has consequences for subsequent CEO compensation practices.”). 
 68. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 534–35. 
 69. Id. at 559. 
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other similar proposals.
70
 Significantly, votes against DRR exceed those 
shareholder votes against the reelection of directors of firms.
71
  
Studies do seem to suggest that, at the margin, shareholders use their 
votes on DRR to convey their dissatisfaction with excessive pay 
practices.
72
 One paper by Alissa suggests that shareholders are in 
dissention when pay and performance are “mismatched.”73 Moreover, the 
paper recognizes a statistically significant correlation in excess 
compensation and dissenting shareholder votes.
74
 Similarly, the Carter and 
Zamora study indicates shareholder disapproval is highest when CEO 
salary is higher, there is weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity in bonus 
pay, and there is greater potential dilution from stock-based compensation, 
particularly in stock option pay.
75
 Sheehan similarly concludes her U.K. 
study by noting that “institutional investors use the threat of a negative 
vote to enforce compliance.”76 
Evidence regarding boards’ responsiveness to shareholders’ 
nonbinding votes is mixed. Ferri and Maber found that firms did respond 
to high shareholder dissention by “removing controversial provisions 
criticized as rewards for failure, such as long notice periods and retesting 
provisions for option grants.”77 Furthermore, their study found a 
“significant increase in the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance,” 
especially where firms experienced high shareholder dissention at a first 
 
 
 70. Conyon & Sadler, supra note 62, at 21–22. The study contrasted DRR dissention with 
negative shareholder votes on ten other resolutions regarding: director elections, major acquisitions or 
disposals, appointing or approving auditors’ remuneration, equity decisions, the company generally 
(e.g., name change, wind up, delisting, or donation authorization), dividend distribution, articles of 
association amendments, more specific remuneration issues, contingent votes, and accepting other 
reports or accounts. Id. at 16. 
 71. Id. at 22. For example, amidst the 2003 GlaxoSmithKline shareholder voting drama 
regarding the pay of CEO Dr. Grenier, shareholder dissent for the first time exceeded 50 percent as to 
a DRR resolution, but the re-election of the CEO attracted 75 percent shareholder support. Id. at 20–
21. Illustrating “shareholders are prepared to signal dissatisfaction by voting against pay, but not to the 
degree of removing directors.” Id. at 21. 
 72. See Sheehan, supra note 62, at 29 (offering evidence that shareholders are more likely to vote 
against DRR resolutions than board election as evidence that “DRR is a way to signal shareholder 
dissatisfaction to the firm about pay”); Alissa, supra note 55, at 23 (offering her study as evidence that 
shareholders disapprove mismatches between pay and performance such that “[t]he higher the 
mismatch, the greater the dissatisfaction expressed by shareholders”). 
 73. Alissa, supra note 55, at 23. 
 74. Id. at 16, 23–24 (expressly ruling out the possibility shareholders vote based on pure “level of 
compensation” such that “higher overall levels of total compensation would result in greater 
shareholders dissatisfaction”). 
 75. Carter & Zamora, supra note 62, at 19–24. 
 76. Sheehan, supra note 62, at 18–19. 
 77. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 559. The authors do note that their evidence is the result of a 
study done only from changes in disclosed provisions of compensation contracts and therefore may not 
capture the “full effect of say on pay compensation practices.” Id. at 547. 
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vote and at firms with excess CEO pay before the Say on Pay regulation.
78
 
Consistent with the other relevant studies, however, Ferri & Maber 
confirm that after controlling for performance, there is no change in the 
growth rate of CEO pay.
79
 
Providing a somewhat more tempered result, Carter and Zamora 
indicate, “when given the contractual opportunity . . . boards do respond 
with lower [compensation] increases than other firms.”80 Their paper 
claims that when executives respond they “curb[] salary increases and 
dilution from stock option grants” thereby improving CEO bonus PPS 
links.
81
 
While Alissa finds “no evidence for the hypothesis that the board 
responds to shareholders’ dissatisfaction by changing excess 
compensation,” his results do indicate that where CEO excess pay is above 
the mean, boards respond by reducing excess compensation.
82
 
Alternatively, the second prong of Alissa’s study suggests that boards 
similarly respond to shareholder pressure and dissatisfaction by “forcing” 
the CEO out of office.
83
 Therefore, this bifurcated test leads Alissa to 
conclude that boards are responsive to shareholders’ votes.84 
Conversely, the Conyon study shows “little evidence of a relation 
between CEO pay and shareholder dissent on the directors’ remuneration 
report.”85 Furthermore, the study states no evidence exists that CEO pay is 
negatively correlated with previous shareholder voting dissent in firm’s 
greater “excess pay.”86 However, Ferri and Maber offer an interesting 
insight (predicted by many) to rebut this negative view of a board’s 
responsiveness, suggesting that “many firms removed this provision ahead 
of the vote, presumably in an attempt to avoid voting dissent and 
consistent with institutional investors’ preference for ‘bargaining in the 
shadow.’”87  
 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 554. 
 80. Carter & Zamora, supra note 62, at 23. 
 81. Id. at 24. 
 82. Alissa, supra note 55, at 26–27. 
 83. Id. at 27–29 (defining “forcing out of office” and providing results). 
 84. Id. at 35. 
 85. Conyon & Sadler, supra note 62, at 25. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Ferri & Maber, supra note 3, at 546. 
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3. New Legislation Implementing Binding Say on Pay 
In June 2012, the U.K.’s Department for Business Innovation & Skills 
released a consultation proposing compensation reporting regulations and 
implementation of binding Say on Pay in the U.K. for companies with 
shares on the Financial Services Authority’s Official List88 as well as all 
U.K. companies listed on the NYSE, the NASDAQ, or with shares listed 
in another EEA state, beginning in October 2013.
89
 Under its auspices, 
U.K. companies will now be required to put to an annual binding 
shareholder vote its “director remuneration policy, including its approach 
to termination payments.”90 If a company fails a binding vote on 
compensation, “it must continue using the last policy approved by 
shareholders until a revised policy is approved.”91 The new proposal’s 
expanded disclosure requirements require companies to set out their exit 
payment approach in the compensation policy report, subject to the 
binding shareholder vote.
92
 This proposal
93
 was recently enacted into 
law.
94
  
 
 
 88. Danielle Harris, UK Reform on Director Pay, GOVERNANCE, Sept. 2012, at 8 (noting that it 
is irrelevant if the shares have a premium or standard listing). 
 89. Id.; DEP’T FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, DIRECTORS’ PAY: CONSULTATION ON 
REVISED REMUNERATION REPORTING REGULATIONS 15 (June 2012). 
 90. Binding Shareholder Say-on-Pay Vote on Route to Reality in the UK: US Companies Take 
Note, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 4 (July 9, 2012), http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/3b4b3be5-0f26-49ce-9c95-
0bfd5207e8df/Presentation/NewsAttachment/2339ed13-5b2d-4e59-9830-0ce4ed80a645/CGSH%20 
Alert%20-%20Gov%20UK%20Binding%20Say%20on%20Pay.pdf. 
 91. Id. at 6. 
 92. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Stephanie Green, “Say on Pay”: The Movement to Reform 
Executive Compensation in the United States and European Union, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 593 
(2011). 
 93. Draft Statutory Instrument: the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts 
and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, Mar. 13, 2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/publications/draft-statutory-instrument-on-directors-remuneration-the-large-and-medium-
sized-companies-and-groups-accounts-and-reports-amendment-regulations-2013 (last visited June 15, 
2013). 
 94. Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, (Eng.) available at http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/enacted; Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, § 79 
(Eng.) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/part/6/crossheading/payments-to-
directors-of-quoted-companies/enacted (displaying the remuneration portion of the Act). 
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C. Say on Pay in Australia 
1. Overview 
Executive pay in Australia grew greatly between 1993 and 2008, 
showing the largest growth between the mid-90s and 2000.
95
 This growth 
in executive compensation is largely attributable to increases in incentive 
pay.
96
 However, even as Australian pay rates increased significantly, 
absolute CEO pay level remained well below Australia’s peers the U.S. 
and the U.K., aligning Australia with many smaller European countries.
97
  
In response to shareholders’ and other market participants’ “general 
unease” about executive pay, the Australian government inserted section 
250R (2) into the Corporations Act of 2001 (Cth).
98
 This section required a 
nonbinding shareholder vote on all listed companies’ remuneration 
reports, at the annual general meeting (AGM).
99
  
Professor Sheehan studied the Australian experience during 2005 to 
2008 using voting data from 109 companies listed on the S&P/ASX 
200.
100
 She concluded that the data showed a progressively higher rate of 
shareholder dissention over the years studied. This is consistent with data 
in the 2009 Productivity Commission Report, which claims that the global 
financial crisis was a leading cause of high negative votes at companies.
101
  
After the financial crisis, Australia’s Productivity Commission 
reviewed the history and regulatory framework of Australia’s executive 
remuneration regulations, and made several important 
recommendations.
102
 On June 20, 2011, the Australian Senate passed the 
Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and 
 
 
 95. PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN AUSTRALIA xv–xvi, xvi fig.1 
(2009) (showing likelihood executive compensation at Australia’s largest public companies grew by as 
much as 300%). 
 96. Id. at xvii (noting the “long-term” incentives tripled between 2004 and 2007). 
 97. Id. at xix–xx. 
 98. Larelle Chapple & Blake Christensen, The Non-Binding Vote on Executive Pay: A Review of 
the CLERP 9 Reform, 18 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 263, 263 (2005). 
 99. Id. (section 250R(3) speaks to the “nonbinding” nature of the vote). 
 100. Kym Sheehan, Say on Pay and the Outrage Constraint, EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION REP. 
(Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Sheehan, Say on Pay], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679622; Kym Sheehan, Is the Outrage Constraint an Effective 
Constraint on Executive Remuneration? Evidence from the UK and Preliminary Results from 
Australia, EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION REP. (Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Sheehan, Outrage 
Constraint], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=974965. 
 101. PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 95, at 282–86. 
 102. Id. at xxxiv (providing a table summarizing recommendations and with the targeted benefits 
of each). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
670 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:653 
 
 
 
 
Executive Remuneration) Bill 2011,
103
 which included substantial changes 
to prior Say on Pay provisions. 
2. Say on Pay: The Two-Strike Rule 
An explanatory memorandum, released by the Australian Parliament, 
weighed the positive and negatives of a nonbinding shareholder vote. The 
memorandum recognized that nonbinding shareholder votes might provide 
benefits, such as “increased dialogue between companies and shareholders 
on remuneration issues.”104 Furthermore, it openly acknowledged evidence 
that “some boards are responsive to the non-binding vote, and that the 
opportunity for shareholders to put forward their views is having a positive 
impact on remuneration policies.”105 Still, the Australian Parliament was 
uncomfortable with existing legislation that imposed no penalty on 
nonresponsive boards in the face of a negative nonbinding shareholder 
vote (except the “nuclear option” of director removal).106  
Australia similarly recognized significant deficiencies in the 
alternative—binding shareholder votes. Specifically, the memo noted that 
binding shareholder votes had the potential to “absolve directors of their 
responsibility to shareholders” regarding executive compensation, thereby 
undermining the broad authority of the board to make decisions. It further 
noted concern that a binding shareholder vote would “affect the 
competitiveness of Australian companies and their ability to attract and 
retain top executives.”107 After weighing its options, Australia settled 
somewhere in between: while resisting moving to a mandatory binding 
shareholder vote, the new regulations purport to strengthen a mandatory 
non-binding vote with the “Two-Strike Rule.”108 
 
 
 103. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A 
00042. For a helpful summary of the legislation, see New Director and Executive Remuneration 
Legislation Passed by Parliament, ERNST & YOUNG 1 (June 2011), available at http://www.ey.com/ 
Publication/vwLUAssets/New_director_and_executive_remuneration_legislation/$FILE/Corporations
%20Amendment_Improveration%20Bill%202011%20-%20FINAL.pdf. The private opinions 
submitted to the Treasury may be found at the treasury’s archived site, http://archive.treasury. 
gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1960 archived at http://perma.cc/RS9U-TUKG. 
 104. Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on 
Director and Executive Remuneration) Bill 2011 (Cth) 5 (Austl.) [hereinafter Explanatory 
Memorandum], available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1925/PDF/Explanatory_ 
Memorandum.pdf. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 6. 
 108. Id. The Productivity Commissions inquiry concluded practical difficulties and risks 
precluded adoption of binding shareholder votes on pay. Id. at 5. The commission identified the 
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The Two-Strike Rule provides shareholders of listed companies an 
opportunity to “spill the board” if the company remuneration report 
receives a negative reception at two consecutive AGMs.
109
 The “first 
strike” occurs when a company receives a “no” vote of 25% or more of the 
shareholder votes cast on its remuneration report.
110
 Following a first 
strike, the company’s subsequent remuneration report must explain the 
board’s response and proposed action or inaction.111  
At the next AGM, upon receiving a second consecutive “no” vote of 
25% or more of the shareholders’ votes cast on the remuneration report 
(the “second strike”), the shareholders will be required to vote on a “spill 
resolution” at the same AGM.112 This spill resolution will determine 
whether the company’s directors will need to stand for re-election at a 
“spill meeting.”113 If the spill resolution receives 50% or more of the 
eligible shareholder votes cast, the separate spill meeting must be held 
within 90 days.
114
 The second strike and the spill resolution were 
intentionally separated to ensure that shareholders are not discouraged 
from voting against the remuneration report for fear of director removal.
115
  
To ensure the effectiveness of the spill resolution following the first 
strike, in a company’s meeting papers for their next AGM, a company 
must provide notice of the potential for a spill resolution at that AGM, in 
case a second strike triggers such a resolution.
116
 Furthermore, following a 
passage of the spill resolution, a company must still provide the minimum 
notice period required by both the Corporations Act and any self-imposed 
 
 
uncertainty and delay stemming from the inability of finalizing executive contracts and certain 
possible operational disruptions, as two such risks. Id. 
 109. Blake Dawson (Ashurst), Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director 
and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011, at 3 (2011), available at www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_ 
Content=6930, archived at http://perma.cc/A4LS-L.  
 110. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), para 300A(1)(g); see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, 
at 6; Ernst & Young, supra note 103, at 2. 
 111. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), para 300A(1)(g); see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, 
at 6; Ernst & Young, supra note 103, at 2.  
 112. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 7. 
 113. Ernst & Young, supra note 103, at 2. 
 114. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), s 250V; see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 6; 
Ernst & Young, supra note 103, at 2. 
 115. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 7. 
 116. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), ss 249L(2); see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 7 
(to clarify, the AGM that requires notice of the spill resolution is the AGM following the first strike 
AGM, at which the second strike vote would occur). 
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notice period set out in the company constitution to ensure shareholders’ 
ability to nominate and endorse board candidates at the special re-election 
meeting (spill meeting).
117
 
At the spill meeting, all of the directors, except the managing 
director,
118
 serving “when the resolution to make the directors’ report” was 
considered, must stand for re-election. Furthermore, such directors cease 
to hold office at that time unless they are re-appointed by the 
shareholders.
119
 However, if a vacating director is re-appointed, their term 
continues as though it were uninterrupted.
120
 Such surviving directors 
serve the duration of their appointment from the date that they were last 
appointed to the board.
121
 Also, at the spill meeting shareholders will vote 
on resolutions to appoint persons to the vacated positions.
122
 
Section 250X disallows a complete board spill, requiring that at least 
the managing director and the two people receiving the highest portion of 
the votes, though not necessarily a majority, remain.
123
 If two or more 
individuals have the same percentage of votes, the remaining director(s) 
may choose which of the candidates is appointed as a director, but this 
appointment must be approved at the company’s next AGM.124 
If the spill meeting does not convene by the end of the ninety-day 
period, each director in office at the end of such period is strictly liable.
125
 
Section 249CA of the Corporation’s Act empowers any director of a listed 
company to call a meeting of the company’s members, thus ensuring every 
 
 
 117. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), s 250W; Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 6–7.  
 118. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), ss 250V(1); see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 7 
(ASX listing rules permit managing directors to hold office indefinitely and without re-election). 
 119. Dawson, supra note 109, at 3. However, if the directors that are up for re-election do not 
remain in office until the spill meeting or the (potentially) ninety days preceding it, then the meeting 
need not be held. Id. This is true whether or not the vacating directors’ positions have been filled. Id. at 
8. 
 120. Id. at 3. 
 121. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), s 250Y. This provision prevents directors from receiving a “fresh start 
through re-election vote as providing directors a fresh start. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 
104, at 9. 
 122. Dawson, supra note 109, at 3. 
 123. Id. at 4. 
 124. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), s 250X; see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 8–9.  
 125. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), ss 250W(5); see also Dawson, supra note 109, at 4. A single exception 
applies for directors who are appointed after the last date on which notice may be given for the spill 
meeting under § 249HA. See also Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director 
and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth), s 250W(8). 
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director has the practical ability to avoid the offense.
126
 Section 250U has a 
resetting mechanism that only allows consideration of a spill resolution at 
every second AGM.
127
 This rule applies to remuneration report votes held 
after July 1, 2011, allowing a spill resolution to be triggered only where 
both strikes occur after that date.
128
  
3. Initial (Mixed) Reactions to the Two-Strike Rule 
One year after the enactment of the Two-Strike Rule, 28 
(approximately 9%) of ASX 200 companies,
129
 and 106 ASX companies 
overall,
130
 received a first strike making them susceptible to a dangerous 
strike two in the next proxy season.
131
 These numbers generated a wide 
range of responses from commentators with investor groups “warmly 
welcom[ing]” the new bill, while the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors referred to it as a “‘heavy-handed black letter law approach’ that 
would produce unnecessary red tape.”132 
A recent survey of the Australian-based law firm Allens Linklaters’s 
listed company clients shows 72% express disapproval of the Two-Strike 
Rule suggesting “significant (AGM) reform” is necessary, with a majority 
 
 
 126. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 8. 
 127. Dawson, supra note 109, at 4. 
 128. Ernst & Young, supra note 103, at 2 (a no vote after July 1, 2011 results in the first strike); 
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 104, at 8. 
 129. Matt Orsagh, “Say on Pay” in Australia: Two Strikes and You’re Out, CFA INSTITUTE (Sept. 
26, 2012), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2012/09/26/say-on-pay-in-australia-two-strikes-
and-youre-out/, archived at http://perma.cc/RG2H-556N. 
 130. Greg Dooley of Computershare Investor Services reports, 106 ASX companies received a 
first strike on their 2011 remuneration report, 14 of which he reports were ASX200 with 4 in the 
ASX100. See Greg Dooley, 2011 AGM season—Providing Clues to What Lies Ahead, KEEPING GOOD 
COMPANIES, Mar. 2012, at 86–87, available at http://www.computershare.com/au/Investor%20 
Services/CSA_Mar2012_AGM_Season.pdf archived at http://perma.cc/6H3-DNBG. 
 131. Several different estimates are in other reports. MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES, DIRECTIONS 
2012: CURRENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACING AUSTRALIAN DIRECTORS AND BOARDS 14 (2011), 
available at http://www.mallesons.com/Documents/Directions_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
HY5C-8K5S (stating that at least 60 companies total received a first strike during the 2011 proxy 
season); HENRY DAVIS YORK, TWO STRIKES RULE ENTERS ITS SECOND AGM SEASON 1 (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://www.hdy.com.au/Media/docs/HDY_Insight_Corporate%20Advisory_Aug%2012-
bf5a0c01-fca6-485b-9e79-62f254bcdeb0-0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U4V5-TVD7 (reporting 
over 100 listed companies received their first strike during the 2011 proxy season by attracting over 
25% negative votes against company remuneration reports). For a chart enumerating S&P and ASX 
300 with a first strike on their 2011 remuneration report, see DANIEL J. SMITH & MICHAEL CHANDLER, 
ISS, 2012 VOTING SEASON PREVIEW: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (2012), available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/private/AustraliaNZPreview2012.pdf. 
 132. See Australian Shareholders to Get More Say on Pay, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2011), http:// 
articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-03/markets/30035966_1_shareholders-remuneration-responsible-
investor. 
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believing the rule should be scrapped entirely.
133
 Similarly, the Sydney-
based law firm Mallesons Stephen Jaques publicly renounced the 
effectiveness of the Two-Strike Rule in an annual publication based on its 
experience and November 2011 client director surveys.
134
 The firm 
summarizes the common critique of the reform stating: 
The reforms appear to have drawn the attention of boards away 
from matters of greater strategic value to organizations and have 
largely been used as a punitive mechanism by disgruntled 
shareholders frustrated by challenging market conditions, rather 
than as a means of communicating shareholders’ assessments of 
executive remuneration. In the words of one survey respondent, 
“the reforms . . . only add compliance costs and provide a larger 
voice to activist minority shareholders.”135  
On the other side of the issue, a 2012 Melbourne Institute and Global 
Proxy Solicitation study indicates 53.2% of shareholders report being 
“[m]ore . . . likely to vote against” a remuneration report this year if their 
company received a first strike at the 2011 AGM.
136
 The same study 
shows 68.4% of shareholders report being more likely to vote against the 
board’s re-election following its second strike.137 
In 2012, Australian companies and executives have forgone bonuses, 
raises, and incentive compensation perhaps due in some part to weak 
shareholder returns and fear of the Two-Strike Rule.
138
 Several Australian 
 
 
 133. ALLENS LINKLATERS, ALLENS LISTED CLIENT SURVEY: CAMAC REVIEW OF ANNUAL 
GENERAL MEETINGS 2 (2012), http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/CAMACAllensListedClientSurvey 
Report.pdf archived at http://perma.cc/63NY-5REF; see also Matt Orsagh, supra note 129 (citing 
Susannah Moran, Call to Overhaul AGMs Puts ‘Two Strikes’ Rule on Remuneration in the Firing Line, 
AUSTRALIAN (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/call-to-overhaul-
agms-puts-two-strikes-rule-related-to-remuneration-in-the-firing-line/story-fn91v9q3-122 6445141935 
(subscription required)). For a specific articulation of management’s disapproval of the Two-Strike 
Rule (and other provisions) see the IAG’s submission in opposition of the Treasury’s Exposure Draft 
Bill, available at http://iag.com.au/news/gov_submissions/docs/20110309_SUB.pdf; and Kym 
Sheehan’s similarly submitted opposition, available at http://docsfiles.com/pdf_submission_to_ 
exposure_draft_corporations_amendment_further.html. 
 134. MALLESONS, supra note 131, at 1. 
 135. Id. at 13 (alteration in original). 
 136. UNIV. OF MELBOURNE, FACULTY OF BUS. & ECON., THE GLOBAL PROXY—MELBOURNE 
INSTITUTE SHAREHOLDER CONFIDENCE INDEX 3 (2012), http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/ 
downloads/macro/2012/GPS/GPS_MI_Report_Aug2012.pd; see also SMITH & CHANDLER, supra note 
131, at 3. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Matt Orsagh, supra note 129 (citing Matt Orsagh, Corporate Governance Roundup, CFA 
INSTITUTE (Aug. 31, 2012), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2012/08/31/corporate-governance 
-roundup-aussie-bosses-give-back-turkeys-new-code-manu-a-bad-investment-director-defenestration-in-
u-s/, archived at http://perma.cc/JW5B-DJ34); see also SMITH & CHANDLER, supra note 131, at 6; 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/7
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companies have already promised to restrain pay policies even despite 
their rising earnings,
139
 in what some have called “high-profile displays of 
remuneration ‘austerity.’”140 Other CEOs and boards have enforced cuts 
and freezes to fixed salaries for top executives.
141
 The ISS claims these 
actions show “a burgeoning trend amongst some captains of industry to 
blunt allegations of runaway executive remuneration.”142 One recent 
academic study finds that in the first year of the “two strike” rule “CEO 
pay changes were negatively related to the level of shareholder dissent on 
the remuneration report,” but that shareholders may have been too harsh 
on firms.
143
 In the second year, however, the authors find that this trend 
was mitigated, especially for firms that received their second strike. 
D. Belgium 
1. Regulatory Framework for Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Remuneration Arrangements 
The Belgian legal rules relating to compensation are straightforward: 
the company’s articles of association (or, if they are silent, the general 
meeting of shareholders) determine both whether the directors shall be 
remunerated
144
 and, if they are to be paid, the remuneration package for 
the services as board member.
145
 Alternatively, the shareholders at the 
general meeting could indirectly decide to pay the directors by approving 
the company’s accounts in which the remuneration is included (as a 
cost).
146
 The general meeting of shareholders’ decision about the 
remuneration of the directors only relates to the total amount granted to 
 
 
Jane Wardell, Australian CEOs Sacrifice Bonuses, Wary of Powerful Shareholders, TRUST.ORG (Aug. 
23, 2012), http://www.trust.org/trustmedia/news/australian-ceos-sacrifice-bonuses-wary-of-powerful-
shareholders/ (discussing Australian CEOs forgoing bonuses). 
 139. Matt Orsagh, supra note 129 (noting announcements by ANZ Bank CEO Mike Smith and 
Commonwealth Bank CEO Ian Narev). 
 140. SMITH & CHANDLER, supra note 131, at 6. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 7. 
 143. Reza Monem & Chew Ng, Australia’s ‘Two-Strikes’ Rule and Pay-Performance Link: Are 
Shareholders Judicious?, 9 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. & ECON. 237, 238 (2013), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2334285. 
 144. The Belgian director can be remunerated, but does not have to be. CODE DES SOCIETES 
[C.SOC] [COMPANIES CODE] art. 517 (Belg.). 
 145. D. Willermain, Le statut de l’administrateur de sociétés anonymes: principes, questions et 
réflexions, 2008 REVUE DES SOCIÉTÉS 207, 236. 
 146. Id. at 236 n.95. 
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the board of directors. The board of directors decides how this total 
compensation package will be divided between the directors.
147
  
In 2002, the statutory creation of a modified two-tier board structure in 
the Belgian Companies Code affected the director remuneration rules.
148
 
Firms have the option through their articles of association to empower the 
board of directors to delegate a large part of its powers to a management 
committee. In the event that the company’s articles of association do not to 
provide rules for setting the compensation of the management committee 
members, the board of directors is empowered to set the remuneration 
package.
149
 The board of directors has the power to set the pay of the 
corporate senior officers, such as the members of the management board 
and/or officers empowered to execute the day-to-day management of the 
company. The duties of the executive board members are therefore split 
between board membership and providing their services as executives.  
Shareholders’ powers to determine executive compensation at Belgian 
companies were increased after the financial crisis and the national and 
international debates regarding excessive remuneration of top executives. 
The law of April 6, 2010 altered the corporate governance rules for 
executive pay for listed and state-owned companies.
150
 As a result, in their 
annual reports Belgian firms must now include a corporate governance 
statement,
151
 as well as a detailed remuneration report. Moreover, they 
must establish a remuneration committee, set criteria for the variable part 
of the executive remuneration and have generous golden parachutes 
approved by the shareholders.  
In addition, the general meeting of shareholders must every year vote 
on the company’s remuneration report, a “Say on Pay” vote. According to 
the Companies Act, the remuneration report must provide detailed 
information on eleven remuneration items: (i) the process the board used 
in developing the remuneration policy, (ii) a statement of how the 
directors applied the remuneration policy during the accounting period, 
(iii) the remuneration package of each individual non-executive board 
member, (iv) the remuneration that senior executive officers receive for 
their role as directors, (v) the criteria and procedure to grant performance 
related pay to executive board members and senior executive officers, 
 
 
 147. Id. at 237. 
 148. Law of Aug. 2, 2002, Moniteur Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 22, 2002, 
36555 (Belg.). 
 149. C.SOC art. 524 (Belg.).  
 150. Law of April 6, 2010, M.B., April 23, 2010, 22709 (Belg.). 
 151. Council Directive 78/660, art. 46a, 1978 O.J. (L222) 27 (EC), on the annual accounts of 
certain types of companies, inserted by Council Directive 2006/46, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1 (EU). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/7
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(vi)a detailed description of the individual remuneration package of the 
chief executive officer, (vii) a detailed description of the global 
remuneration package of the other senior executive officers, (viii) the 
number and main characteristics of shares, options and other rights 
granted, vested and/or executed, (ix) severance pay commitments, (x) the 
applied severance pay in case an executive board member or senior 
executive officer departed, and (xi) claw back provisions for variable pay 
based on misleading financial information.
152
 
The shareholder vote is advisory so that the company is not obliged to 
revise any contractual engagements. Nor does the disapproval of the 
remuneration report affect the validity of the company’s financial 
statements. However, if the shareholders disapprove the remuneration 
report, the board of directors is likely to revise the company’s 
remuneration policy.
153
  
The law of April 6, 2010 amended the Belgian Companies Code to 
give shareholders further power to restrict the structuring of the variable 
remuneration package and the share-based remuneration of the executives. 
It now requires a shareholder vote, or a facilitating article of association,
154
 
if the remuneration package of an executive board member or a senior 
executive provides for variable remuneration of which more than half is 
based on performance criteria of one year or less, or grants more than one 
quarter of the variable remuneration based on performance criteria 
measured over less than two years, or awards more than one quarter of the 
variable remuneration based on performance criteria measured over less 
than three years.
155
  
Furthermore, the Belgian Companies Code now also requires 
shareholder approval, or a facilitating article of association, to deviate 
from a minimum “vesting period” for shares and share-based 
remuneration. Shares must not be vested earlier than three years after they 
are granted, while share options or other share-based benefits must not be 
exercisable earlier than three years after they are granted.
156
 Finally, 
 
 
 152. C.SOC art. 96, § 3 (Belg.). 
 153. Belgian House of Representatives, 2336/001, at 18 (Dec. 22, 2009). 
 154. For which the general meeting of shareholders need to provide in the amendment of the 
articles of association. 
 155. C.SOC art. 520ter (Belg.). This provision is not applicable if the variable part of the 
remuneration is less than 25 percent of the total remuneration. Id. 
 156. CODE DES SOCIETES [C.SOC] art. 520ter, § 1 (Belg.). This provision is not applicable in case 
the variable part of the remuneration is less than 25 percent of the total remuneration. For an overview 
and analysis, see Hans De Wulf, Christoph Van der Elst & S. Vermeesch, 2010 Radicalisering van 
corporate governanceregelgeving: remuneratie en transparantie na de wet van 6 april 2010, 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH HANDELSRECHT 909–62.  
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severance pay arrangements with executive directors and senior executive 
officers that exceed the amount of 12 months
157
 remuneration
158
 require 
the pre-approval of the general meeting of shareholders.
159
  
2. Assessment of Shareholder Voting Power on Executive 
Remuneration Agreements in Belgium 
The new Belgian Corporate Governance Code, with both a mandatory 
“Comply or Explain” requirement and a mandatory requirement to provide 
a remuneration report, greatly increased the amount of information 
disclosed concerning the remuneration of directors and executives and 
corporate remuneration practices. Previously most corporate boards did 
little to insure that shareholders had much say on executive remuneration 
policies. For example, in 2011, the last year before the new Say on Pay 
law came into operation, only 40% of the companies had the total gross 
remuneration package of the board of directors, or of a newly elected 
director, explicitly approved by the general shareholder meeting. The 
remaining companies had the directors’ pay automatically approved with 
the approval of the financial statements.  
In 2012, once the new Say on Pay law went into effect, over 90% of 
the companies put the item “remuneration report” on the agenda of the 
general meeting of shareholders.
160
 Once again, companies’ remuneration 
reports received high approval ratings from shareholders, although lower 
on average than in 2011. In Bel 20 companies,
161
 the mean approval rate 
for companies’ remuneration reports was 90.6%. A broader set of 
companies showed an even higher approval rate of 95.3%. In both 
instances, the median approval rates were even higher.  
However, these figures conceal some companies where shareholder 
opposition was significant. For example, the shareholders of Agfa 
approved the company’s remuneration report by a bare minimum with 
 
 
 157. In legal doctrine, it is debated whether the legislation requires the approval of the general 
meeting of shareholder from twelve months onwards, Wulf, Van der Elst & Vermeesch, supra note 
156, at 946, or from eighteen months onwards, M. Wyckaert & T. Boedts, Remuneratie van ‘leiders’ 
van genoteerde vennootschappen na de wet van 6 april 2010, 5 TIJDSCHRIFT ESTATE PLANNING 291, 
306 (2010). 
 158. The Dutch wording in the law is “wage.” 
 159. The next general meeting of shareholders must pre-approve this severance pay arrangement. 
The arrangement is null and void in case this procedure is not applied.  
 160. The other companies did not comply with the law (Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholders as 
Stewards: Evidence from Belgian General Meetings 16 (Fin. Law Inst., Univ. of Ghent, Working 
Paper No. 2013-05, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2270938.  
 161. Bel 20 is an index of the twenty Belgian blue chip stocks. Bel 20, EURONEXT (last updated 
Jan. 30, 2015), https://indices.euronext.com/ en/products/indices/BE0389555039-XBRU. 
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only 50.3% of the votes cast in favor, while the AGM of EVS approved its 
report with 64%, and only 69% of the Delhaize shareholders approved its 
report.
162
 Importantly, all three companies have a relatively dispersed-
ownership structure, and the other agenda items for the AGM, including 
the remuneration of the board members, were overwhelmingly 
approved.
163
 Nevertheless, these votes clearly signaled discontent amongst 
these firms’ shareholders with the board’s remuneration policy.164 At the 
2013 general meeting of the government controlled telecom operator 
Belgacom the shareholders disapproved the remuneration report. The 
government held a large stake and withheld its votes, while over 70% of 
the remaining shareholders
165
 voted against the report because it contained 
overly generous remuneration packages for the managers and directors.
166
 
Later that year, the CEO was dismissed and replaced.
167
 The new CEO had 
to agree with a salary of maximum €650,000, less than half of the 
remuneration package of the previous CEO.
168
 In 2014 the remuneration 
report of Belgacom was approved, although the government still 
abstained.
169
  
In 2014 some other companies, like Agfa Gevaert and Arseus, 
experienced at the AGM a no vote for their remuneration report. Both 
companies started up discussions with shareholders to find out what 
triggered the investors to vote against the remuneration report.
170
  
A remuneration report highlights many features of executive 
remuneration that can deviate from the proxy advisors,’ as well as many 
investors,’ positions. These can lead to the Pensions Investment Research 
 
 
 162. Van der Elst, supra note 160, at 15. 
 163. Id. at 16. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Only 5% of the attending shareholders supported the remuneration report. 
 166. The minutes of the meeting are available at http://www.belgacom.com/assets/content/mb 
import/%7B6B2D2E46-9049-46DA-8C21-1BB1DCAF3C1A%7D?transformationID=CustomContent 
&contentType=content/custom&previewSite=cow (last visited May 3, 2013), archived at http://perma. 
cc/GB8Y-F3A3.  
 167. Temmerman, Labille: Belgacom is back to business, DE STANDAARD (Nov. 15, 2013, 21:21 
PM), http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20131115_00839834. 
 168. Van Belle, Akkoord over nieuwe CEO Belgacom, DE STANDAARD (Jan. 8, 2014, 12:52 PM), 
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20140108_00918105. 
 169. The minutes of the meeting are available at http://www.belgacom.com/assets/content/ 
mbimport/%7B4685B5C8-7E07-486D-A94F-7AD0F9AC23E3%7D?transformationID=Custom 
Content&contentType=content/custom&previewSite=cow (last visited August 20, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6E9C-PH88. 
 170. Stefaan Michielsen, Aandeelhoudersstem vervliegt in de wind, DE TIJD (May 17, 2014, 0:00 
AM), available at http://www.tijd.be/nieuws/archief/Aandeelhoudersstem_vervliegt_in_de_wind. 
9502933-1615.art?highlight=aandeelhoudersstem%20vervliegt. 
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Consultants (PIRC),
171
 ISS and ECGS opposing, or issuing an “abstain 
vote” recommendation on, the company’s remuneration report. Many 
investment managers follow these recommendations.
172
 This is the likely 
explanation of the significantly higher shareholder opposition for the 
remuneration report, and in case of a company with a more dispersed 
shareholder structure, of even a majority no vote, like Agfa Gevaert and 
Arseus recently experienced. However, as many Belgian companies are 
blockholder controlled, and these blockholders support management, 
institutional investors’ opposition does not lead to too big of a drop in 
overall shareholder support levels.  
E. France  
1. Regulatory Framework for Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Remuneration Arrangements 
French public limited liability companies (“sociétés anonymes”) are 
free to choose between a one-tier board structure and a two-tier board 
structure in the articles of association. A large majority of the companies 
adopt the one-tier board structure. The French commercial code requires 
the one-tier board of directors to elect a chairman,
173
 either separating or 
combining this position with that of the chief executive officer.
174
  
The French commercial code empowers the general meeting of 
shareholders to approve the total annual directors’ fees for a one-tier board 
and the total annual supervisory board fees for a two-tier board.
175
 This 
amount is paid for their services as board members
176
 and not as executive 
officers. The shareholders must approve these payments, or the directors 
cannot be remunerated. The company can also provide directors with 
 
 
 171. PIRC is an independent research and advisory consultancy. For more information, see 
http://www.pirc.co.uk/. 
 172. Recent research shows that investment funds vote in line with the ISS recommendation in 
69.35 per cent of the agenda items: Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos E. 
Zachariadis, Ties that Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism (ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No. 438/2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2317212. 
 173. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L 225-47 (Fr.).  
 174. C. COM. art. L 225-51-1 (Fr.). This option is provided to the board in 2001. Loi 2001-420 du 
15 mai 2001 sur les Nouvelles Régulations Economiques [Law 2001-420 of May 15, 2001 on the New 
Economic Regulations], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 16, 2001, p. 7776. 
 175. C. COM. art. L 225-47, 225-83 (Fr.).  
 176. This is the “attendance” fee for meetings of the board of directors. 
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travel allowances and reimburse their business expenses
177
 and pay 
directors additional amounts for performing specific duties.
178
 While the 
shareholders approve the total amount of director compensation, only the 
board of directors, or the supervisory board at a two-tier board company, 
can allocate specific amounts of compensation to the individual directors.  
For many years, the shareholders’ only power with respect to director 
pay was their approval over the total remuneration for the board. More 
recently, beginning in 1995, the French legislature has focused on the 
transparency of the remuneration package of directors and executives; 
however, it has not empowered the shareholders to have a “Say on Pay.”179  
Instead, initially in 2005, and subsequently reinforced in 2007, French 
law provides that the general meeting of shareholders must approve two 
parts of a “common” remuneration package of executive directors and 
officers: termination agreements and additional retirement agreements.
180
 
The 2005 Breton Law
181
 determined that for these two types of payment, 
any agreements entered into are subject to the same strict approval 
requirements as those applied to related party transactions.
182
 These 
strictly regulated agreements are only valid if they get prior approval by 
the Board, the chairman of the board sends a notice to the auditors, the 
auditors issue a report, and the general meeting of shareholders approves 
them.
183
 Directors of companies that “failed or directors who have 
personally failed” cannot receive any kind of termination fee.184 Under the 
 
 
 177. C. COM. art. R 225-33 (Fr.).  
 178. Board members can enter into employment agreements with the company.  
 179. Ivan Tchotourian, Une décennie d’excès des dirigeants en matière de rémunération. 
Repenser la répartition des pouvoirs dans l’entreprise: une solution per se porteuse de risques, in 
RISQUES D’ENTREPRISES: QUELLE STRATÉGIE JURIDIQUE? 44–48 (L. Nurit-Pontier & S. Rousseau eds., 
2011). 
 180. Press Release, AMF, Fiche presse: Les remunerations des dirigeants 2 (Dec. 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/9219_1.pdf. The French corporate 
governance code forbids termination agreements from awarding more than two years of the sum of 
fixed and variable remuneration. 
 181. Loi 2005-842 du 26 juillet 2005 pour la confiance et la modernisation de l’économie [Law 
2005-842 of July 26, 2005 on the Trust and Modernization of the Economy], J.O., July 27, 2005, p. 
12160.  
 182. These are defined to include agreements between the company and its CEO, one of its 
Managing Directors, one of its directors, a shareholder holding a fraction of the voting rights in excess 
of 10% or the controlling company entered into directly or through an intermediary. C. COM. art. L 
225-38 (Fr.). This is the authorized agreements and commitments provision. 
 183. These approvals are required every time the agreement is renewed.  
 184. ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE DES ENTREPRISES PRIVÉES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE OF 
LISTED CORPORATIONS at 27 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.afep.com/uploads/medias/ 
documents/Code_gouvernement_entreprise_societes_cotees_Juin_2013_en.pdf. The Code does not 
provide much guidance as to what is considered as a personal failure of the director (“des dirigeants 
qui sont eux-mêmes en situation d’échec”). Id. The Code indicates the “demanding” (individual) 
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2005 law, shareholders can reject termination agreements and additional 
retirement benefits. However, the remaining pieces of an executive’s 
remuneration package are not subject to shareholder approval.
185
  
French company shareholders do have some indirect influence over 
some elements of executive compensation packages. For example, the 
French commercial code requires that the shareholders vote to give the 
board the power to grant (free) restricted stock
186
 and stock options
187
 to 
the employees and the executive directors.
188
 There are also some 
additional disclosure requirements. Under the 2007 TEPA Law,
189
 the 
board of directors must disclose to the shareholders two reports related to 
any termination agreement: one that describes how the directors 
determined the performance conditions and the second detailing how those 
conditions are achieved.
190
  
Like other countries, France has a mandatory “Comply or Explain” 
corporate governance code, called the AFEP-Medef Corporate 
Governance Code of Listed Corporations (“French Corporate Governance 
Code”). Companies in France are free to adopt this code’s principles, but 
are not required to do so if they explain why they do not comply.
191
 This 
code emphasizes the importance of full disclosure of the remuneration 
packages of the executive officers and board members.  
 
 
performance requirements must have been met unless the departure is due to a change of control or 
change in strategy. Id.  
 185. C. COM. art. L 225-40 (Fr.).  
 186. C. COM. art. L 225-197-1 (Fr.). The provision was inserted by Loi 2004-1484 du 30 
décembre 2004 de finances pour 2005 [Law 2004-1484 of December 30, 2004 Relating to the 
Financing 2005], J.O.R.F., Dec. 31, 2004, art. 83, p. 22459.  
 187. The procedure for granting stock options was already introduced in the late 1980s. C. COM. 
art. 225-186-1 (Fr.) (introduced by Loi 87-416 du 17 juin 1987 sur l’épargne [Law 87-416 of June 17, 
1987 on Savings], J.O., June 18, 1987, art. 19). 
 188. The persons to whom the restricted stock and options can be granted are the chairman of the 
board of directors, the chief executive officer, the executive members of the board and the 
management board members in a two tier board structure. 
 189. Loi 2007-1223 du 21 août 2007 en faveur du travail, de l’emploi et du pouvoir d’achat [Law 
2007-1223 of August 21, 2007 to Support Work, Employment and Purchasing Power], J.O., Aug. 22, 
2007, p. 13945. 
 190. Loi 2008-448 du 7 mai 2008 pris pour l’application des articles L. 225-42-1 and L. 225-90-1 
du code de commerce et relatif à la publicité des rémunérations différées [Law 2008-448 of May 7, 
2008 Regarding the Application of the Articles L. 225-42-1 and L. 225-90-1 of the Commercial Code 
and Related to the Publication of the Deferred Remuneration], J.O., May 11, 2008, p. 7831. The board 
of directors must also submit a specific resolution relating to severance pay arrangements for the 
approval of the general meeting of shareholders. Id. 
 191. Gerard Charreaux & Peter Wirtz, Corporate Governance in France 3 (Université de 
Bourgogne Working Paper no. 1070201, 2007), available at http://www.virtusinterpress.org/ 
additional_files/book_corp_govern/sample_chapter04.pdf.  
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In June 2013, the French Corporate Governance Code introduced a 
“Say on Pay” vote for shareholders with companies choosing either to 
comply by providing the vote or to explain why they did not do so. 
Companies that comply are required by Principle 24.3 “to present”192 to 
the general meeting of shareholders for an advisory vote the individual 
remuneration packages of the executive directors (i.e. the corporate 
officers). They must disclose both fixed and variable compensation on an 
annual and, where necessary, multi-year basis. The disclosures must state 
any exceptional remuneration, share options, performance shares or other 
long-term pay for performance, golden parachutes, retirement benefits and 
in-kind benefits.  
Shareholders vote separately on the remuneration package of the CEO 
and the other executive board members. If the shareholders vote against 
the pay packages (called providing “a negative advice”), the board of 
directors must, at one of its next meetings and after being advised by the 
remuneration committee, “deliberate” about the implications of the 
shareholder vote. Upon concluding these deliberations, the board must 
publish on the company’s website the actions it intends to take, if any, in 
response to the shareholders’ concerns.193 
Enactment of the Comply or Explain principle in the French Corporate 
Governance Code avoided—at least temporarily—the introduction of a 
statutory “Say on Pay” requirement. According to Reuters, the government 
supports the Comply or Explain rule.
194
 However, the French government 
introduced a new tax regime for the “rich,” indirectly addressing what they 
consider excessive remuneration packages.
195
 Furthermore, at state-
controlled enterprises, including (large) listed companies like EDF and 
Aeroports de Paris, the government has mandated limits on the 
remuneration of the members of the board of directors to €450,000.196 
Clearly there is more to come for executive pay regulation in France. 
 
 
 192. At the time of this writing, the English version of the Code was not yet available.  
 193. Association Française des Entreprises Privées, supra note 184, at 32. 
 194. Leila Abboud, Ad Agency Publicis Brings Say on Pay to France, REUTERS, (May 29, 2013, 
2:08 AM) http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/publicis-pay-idUKL5N0EA2AG20130529?feed 
Type=RSS&feedName=rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews. We presume that the new edition 
of the French corporate governance code with “say on pay” convinced the French government that—at 
the moment—no legislative action is required and that the mandatory Comply or Explain regime of the 
code with respect to provide in a say on pay of individual director’s remuneration is sufficient. 
 195. French law now imposes a tax of 75% that companies have to pay for the remuneration 
packages passing €1 million. Loi 2013-1278 du 29 décembre 2013 de finances pour 2014 [Law 2013-
1278 of December 29, 2013 on the financing of 2014], J.O., Dec. 30, 2013, p. 21829 available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
 196. Loi 2012-915 du 26 juillet 2012 relatif au contrôle de l’Etat sur les rémunérations des 
dirigeants d’entreprises publiques [Decree 2012-915 of July 26, 2012 on the Government Control of 
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2. Assessment of Shareholder Voting Power on Executive 
Remuneration Agreements in France 
In this Part, we pull together heretofore-uncompiled primary data to 
assess the shareholders’ voting power on executive compensation 
arrangements at French companies.
197
 
a. Voting on Total Board Pay 
As discussed above, the shareholders vote to authorize directors’ fees 
for French corporations.
198
 However, companies only need to hold such a 
vote if they seek to increase these fees. Our analysis of the CAC-40
199
 
companies’ minutes from their general meetings from 2010 to 2012 shows 
that 53% of these companies sought shareholders’ approval of directors’ 
fees once during these three years.
200
 More frequent approval was quite 
unusual: just three companies put the item on the agenda twice, and only 
two companies sought approval three times. Figure 1 below illustrates 
these data. We also note that one out of every three companies did not 
seek shareholder approval of these fees during these three years.
201
  
Overall, and consistent with other countries, there is no significant 
opposition against the remuneration of French board members. Only three 
boards experienced opposition of more than 5% of the votes, with highest 
dissenting vote (almost 20%) at Société Générale in 2011.
202
 According to 
ISS research, in 2010 and 2011, the shareholders approved the 
 
 
the Remuneration of the Directors of Government Controlled Companies], J.O., July 27, 2012, p. 
12283.  
 197. Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) and Association Française de Gestion Financière 
(AFG) provide in a general overview of voting issues. ISS, 2012 Proxy Season Review: World 
Markets, at 15–25, http://www.issgovernance.com/files/private/2012CombinedPostseasonReport.pdf 
(last visited July 15, 2013); AFG, Exercice des droits de vote par les sociétés de gestion en 2012, at 16 
(Mar. 2013).  
 198. M. COZIAN, A. VIANDIER & F. DEBOISSY, DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS 303, nr. 541 (2012).  
 199. 38 large companies are in the sample. One company is registered in Belgium, the other in the 
Netherlands. Those two companies were excluded from the list. 
 200. Only one AGM approved the fee in 2012, in all other cases the approval was equally split 
between the AGM 2010 and the AGM 2011. 
 201. Some companies do not change the board fee for even longer periods and hence do not ask 
for any shareholder approval. The latest say on board pay of Saint Gobain was in 2006 and the latest of 
Total was in 2007. The fee of the board of Vivendi remained unchanged between 2000 and 2008, of 
Lafarge between 2001 and 2010, of LVMH between (at least) 2004 and 2012, and at L’Oreal between 
2005 and 2011. 
 202. This disapproval rate already dropped from 27% in 2009. 
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remuneration of the directors with 98.4% and 97.3%, respectively.
203
 The 
approval rates of 2012 do not differ significantly from those of earlier 
years.
204
 
FIGURE 1: APPROVAL OF THE TOTAL BOARD ATTENDANCE FEE AT CAC-40 
COMPANIES’ AGMS 2010–2012 
 
b. Strength of Shareholder Voting on Other Elements of Executive 
Pay 
ISS data shows an increase in the numbers of shareholders voting on 
executive remuneration elements at French general meetings.
205
 In 
particular, they find that votes that are directly or indirectly related to 
compensation, like the vote to authorize the board to grant restricted stock 
to employees and executive directors, and the vote to authorize 
termination agreements, can run into significant opposition.  
 
 
 203. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2010 VOTING RESULTS REPORT EUROPE 23, tbl.12 (Sept. 
16, 2010); INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2011 VOTING RESULTS REPORT EUROPE 16, tbl.12 
(Sept. 12, 2011).  
 204. Authors’ calculations based on the minutes for the meetings of CAC-40 companies (on file 
with authors). 
 205. ISS noted an increase in the attendance rates from 64.5% in 2008 to 68.8% in 2011 for 
France.  
all years 
5% 
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One measure of shareholder views on executive compensation is how 
they vote on share incentive plans. In 2010, ISS found that the mean 
shareholder dissent rate for these plans was 14.2%, which dropped to 
12.5% in 2011.
206
 In both years, approximately 10% of these plans were 
rejected by shareholders.
207
 We note that France is the only Continental 
European country where these plans are regularly disapproved. However, 
it is unclear why shareholders fiercely oppose these particular stock plans. 
One plausible explanation could be that the board of directors is viewed as 
being given too much discretionary power in the plans: the board sets the 
performance conditions, selects the beneficiaries, and chooses the 
allotment terms, etc.
208
  
For 2012, we collected data on shareholder voting for all agenda items 
of CAC-40 companies and selected remuneration related agenda items: 
severance payment arrangements, authorization of the board to allot 
restricted stock, and authorization of the board to grant stock options on 
shares and retirement plans. The results are summarized in Table 1 below.  
TABLE 1: AGENDA ITEMS OF GENERAL MEETINGS 2012 OF CAC-40 
COMPANIES RELATED TO REMUNERATION
209
 
 
Number of 
items voted on 
Number of 
companies 
holding votes 
Mean shareholder 
approval rate 
Remarks on Outcome 
of Voting by 
Shareholders 
Termination agreement 16 11 (29%) 66.60% 1 rejected 
Restricted stock  14 13 (34%) 83.81% 
1 rejected/1 
withdrawn 
Share options 4 4 (11%) 92.26% 
 Retirement plan 3 3 (8%) 80.37% 1 rejected
 
Table 1 shows that termination agreements are an agenda item at 29% 
of the companies and that shareholder opposition to them is relatively 
high: the average approval rate was only 66.6%. Looking more carefully at 
 
 
 206. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2010 VOTING RESULTS REPORT EUROPE 23, tbl.12 (Sept. 
16, 2010); INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2011 VOTING RESULTS REPORT EUROPE 16, tbl.12 
(Sept. 12, 2011). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See, e.g., SANOFI, NOTICE OF GENERAL MEETING 2012, at 23 (2012), available at 
http://en.sanofi.com/Images/30146_2012_Avis_convocation_EN.pdf (“[The general meeting] resolves 
that the vesting of the shares will be subject to performance conditions which will be set by the Board 
of Directors concerning a period of at least three years.”). 
 209. Based on thirty-eight of the companies in the CAC-40. Two CAC-40 companies, Solvay and 
EADS, have their registered seat outside of France, although they are listed on the French stock 
exchange. We have excluded these companies from the analysis as they are not subject to the French 
voting rules.  
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the data, we see that two thirds of the termination agreements received 
more than 25% shareholder opposition and that more than 40% of 
shareholders voted against seven such agreements. However, only the 
agreement of the CEO of Safran was disapproved. The shareholders also 
rejected the retirement plan of Safran’s CEO, but the two other retirement 
plans were both approved by more than 98% of the votes.
210
  
Stock option plans are generally considered as appropriate methods for 
incentivizing the executive board and management. Table 1 displays data 
illustrating that none of these plans garnered more than 15% opposition. 
Finally, shareholders were generally less enthusiastic about performance 
share plans. For example, the board of directors of France Telecom chose 
to withdraw this agenda item from the general meeting, while shareholders 
at other companies supported the authorization with less than 86% of the 
votes. 
We also studied the compliance with the aforementioned new best 
practice principle 24.3 “to present” to the general meeting of shareholders 
for an advisory vote the individual remuneration packages of the executive 
directors (i.e. the corporate officers). All CAC-40 companies provided the 
shareholders with this advisory vote of the remuneration package of the 
CEO.
211
 For other corporate officers we found mixed results. Some 
companies offered the shareholders the opportunity to vote on one or more 
executive directors, while others only provided the vote on the 
remuneration package of the CEO. However, the corporate structures of 
French groups differ significantly so it is not directly noticeable whether 
the company fully complied with the best practice 24.3 or not. The 
remuneration package of most CEOs was overwhelmingly approved, with 
80% of the packages receiving more than 90% positive votes. None of the 
remuneration packages was disapproved. However the opposition was 
between 30% and 40% of the votes at three companies. It is too early to 
assess what triggers shareholders to vote against the remuneration package 
of the CEOs of the largest French companies. The total remuneration 
package can only be one of many other reasons. According to research 
published by Capital,
212
 the CEOs of Sanofi, LVMH and L’Oreal all 
gained more than €8 million and shareholders approved these packages 
 
 
 210. The details of the voting results can be found at http://www.safran-group.com/IMG/ 
pdf/Resultats_AGM_SAFRAN_31-05-2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2014) 
 211. Authors’ own research related to the minutes of the 2014 meetings of all of the CAC-40 
companies. 
 212. Le palmarès 2014 des salaires des patrons, CAPITAL.FR (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.capital.fr/ 
carriere-management/special-salaires/2014/le-palmares-2014-des-salaires-des-patrons-922673, archived 
at http://perma.cc/DH4F-EME8. 
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with 98%, 82% and 94%, while the CEO of Safran, who took only €1.6 
million home, had his fee opposed by more than 36% of all shareholders. 
F. Germany 
1. Regulatory Framework for Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Remuneration Arrangements 
a. The Two-Tier Board Structure  
The mandatory two-tier board model is a core feature of the German 
stock corporation: the management board is responsible for running the 
business,
213
 while the supervisory board must supervise the management 
board. The supervisory board can also be asked to approve specific types 
of transactions.
214
 Directors that sit on one board cannot also sit on the 
other board at the same company.
215
 The management board must manage 
and represent the company jointly unless the articles provide otherwise.
216
  
The supervisory board elects the members of the management board 
for a term of up to five years and also has the power to dismiss the board. 
Members of the management board can only be removed for cause, like 
breach of duty or a vote of no confidence of the shareholders.
217
 The 
members of the supervisory board are elected for maximum terms of four 
years. The size of the supervisory board depends on the value of the 
company’s capitalization.218 Further, the composition of the supervisory 
board is determined in part by different co-determination requirements.   
 
 
 213. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I, as amended, § 76, 
para. 1. The management board is composed of at least one natural person with full legal capacity. If 
the capital of the company is more than €3 million, the management board must comprise at least two 
members unless the articles of association allows a management board of one member. Id. § 76, para. 
2. 
 214. Id. § 11, para. 5.  
 215. Id. § 105, para. 1; Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe. Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Italy 6 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 18/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=487944. 
 216. AktG § 77, para. 1, § 78, para. 2.  
 217. Id. § 84, para. 3.  
 218. Id. § 95. The supervisory board must be composed of at least three members, all natural 
persons. The articles of association can provide for a higher number but the number must be divisible 
by three, unless the codetermination laws provide otherwise. The maximum number of supervisory 
board members depends on the share capital of the company. Capital up to €1.5 million allows for a 
board of nine members, capital of more than €1.5 million and up to €10 million allows for a board of 
fifteen members, and capital higher than €10 million allows for a board of up to twenty-one members. 
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b. Shareholder Approval Requirements for Executive 
Remuneration 
As early as 1937, the German Stock Corporation Act required that the 
supervisory board had to make sure that the compensation of the 
management was reasonable, reflecting both the duties of the management 
board as well as the financial condition of the company.
219
 The 1965 
version of this Act confirmed this reasonableness requirement. However, 
case law on the assessment of the reasonableness of the remuneration is 
scarce.
220
  
Under this regime, shareholders had no voting rights on executive pay 
as it was the supervisory board’s responsibility to make this determination. 
The one exception was for share option schemes. The German Stock 
Corporation Act had very strict rules regarding the issuance of shares and 
share related instruments to protect the incumbent shareholders against 
dilution. Prior to 1998, share options for the management board were only 
legally possible with the issuance of convertible, or warrant, bonds which 
required the approval of a three-fourths majority vote of the shareholders 
at a general meeting where more than 50% of the capital of the company 
was represented.
221
 In 1998, the Control and Transparency Act 
(“KonTraG”) explicitly allowed the general shareholders meeting to 
authorize management to buy back stock to use in a stock option plan for 
members of the management board, significantly increasing the use of 
variable pay at German companies. 
In 2009, the German Parliament enacted a new law, the Law on the 
Appropriateness of Director Compensation (“VorstAG”), which changed 
the executive remuneration system in Germany. The new law has three 
main features for listed companies of which one is for stock exchange 
listed companies, the general meeting of shareholders can be (but does not 
 
 
 219. Brigitte Haar, Executive Compensation under German Corporate Law: Reasonableness, 
Managerial Incentives and Sustainability in Order to Enhance Optimal Contracting and to Limit 
Managerial Power, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY, supra note 2, at 486, 490. 
 220. The Regional Court of München stated in 2007 that the remuneration can be reasonable even 
if it is not in line with common practice. Landgericht München I [LG München] [Regional Court of 
Munich], Mar. 29, 2007, Case No. 5 HK O 12931/06 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AKTG 2007] 458, 
2007. 
 221. For a detailed analysis of all the difficulties to issue share (option) schemes for the 
management board, see Theodor Baums, Aktienoptionen für Vorstandsmitglieder, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
CARSTEN PETER CLAUSSEN 3–48 (Klaus-Peter Martens, Harm Peter Westerman & Wolfgang Zöllner 
eds., 1997). 
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have to be) provided an advisory vote regarding the remuneration system 
of the management board.
222
  
The German Corporate Governance Code copied these new 
requirements, providing an option for the shareholders to approve the 
remuneration system for management board directors, but also stating that 
the supervisory board must determine the total compensation of an 
individual member of the management board.
223
  
For supervisory board members, the general meeting of shareholders, 
or the articles of association of the corporation, may set the amount of its 
members’ compensation.224 The supervisory board members’ 
remuneration must be related to the duties of the supervisory board and the 
condition of the company. The German Corporation Act also provides as 
an option that supervisory board members can be paid a short-term bonus 
tied to the profits of the company.
225
  
2. Assessment of Shareholder Voting Power on Executive 
Remuneration Agreements in Germany 
a. Executive Remuneration in Germany 
The development of the remuneration package of the German 
management board is relatively well mapped, partially due to the litigation 
after Vodafone’s acquisition of Mannesmann in 2000 over an award of 
golden parachute severance agreements.  
German executive compensation packages have grown substantially in 
the interim. From 2001 to 2012, the mean remuneration of an average 
member of the management board (“Vorstand”) of the thirty largest 
German public companies listed on the DAX more than doubled from less 
than €1.2 million to more than €3.0 million.226 As Figure 2 illustrates, this 
increase resembles a kinked curve. Between 2001 and 2007, remuneration 
packages jumped significantly. However, in 2008, during the Financial 
Crisis, the compensation of an average member of the Vorstand decreased 
 
 
 222. AktG § 120, para. 4. The law only facilitates that the company allows the general meeting to 
vote on the remuneration system of the management board, there is no mandatory requirement. 
 223. Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex [DCGK] [German Corporate Governance Code] 
Feb. 26, 2002, BUNDESANZEIGER [BANZ.], as amended May 15, 2012, §§ 2.2.1, 4.2.2.  
 224. AktG § 113, para. 1. As neither the articles of association nor the general meeting foresee in 
a remuneration, the members of the supervisory board must provide the services for free. Id. 
 225. Id. § 113, para. 3. 
 226. See Figure 2 below. 
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by almost 30%. Since 2008, the Vorstand members’ pay packages have 
increased again, surpassing their 2007 levels in 2011.  
The CEO receives a much higher compensation than the other 
members. During this period, the mean compensation of the CEO soared 
from €3.7 million to over €5 million. At the highest end, the remuneration 
package of the CEO of Volkswagen reached €17.46 million in 2011.  
FIGURE 2: EVOLUTION OF THE TOTAL REMUNERATION OF AN 
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD 
* The remuneration does not take into account pension contribution. DEUTSCHE SCHUTZVEREINIGUNG 
FÜR WERTPAPIERBESITZ E.V.(DSW), STUDIE ZUR VERGÜTUNG DER VORSTÄNDE IN DEN DAX-UND 
MDAX-UNTERNEHMEN IM GESCHÄFTSJAHR 2010, sheet 7 (2011) (summarizing executive 
compensation for the years 2001–11), available at http://www.dsw-info.de/uploads/media/DSW_ 
Verguetungsstudie_Vorstaende_2011_alle_Charts.pdf; DSW, STUDIE ZUR VERGÜTUNG DER 
VORSTÄNDE IN DEN DAX-UND MDAX-UNTERNEHMEN IM GESCHÄFTSJAHR 2012 sheets 2, 5 (2013) 
(summarizing executive compensation for the years 2011–12), available at http://www.dsw-
info.de/uploads/media/DSW-Verguetungsstudie-2013-Tabellen.pdf, HOSTETTLER KRAMARSCH 
PARTNER, 2013 ERNEUT LEICHT RÜCKLÄUFIGE VORSTANDSVERGÜTUNG IM DAX, (Mar. 2014), 
available at http://www.hkp.com/cms/upload/media/DE/D_010_2014_hkp_PI_GB_ AuswertungVV_ 
DAX_03_2014_final.pdf. 
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b. Results of Shareholder Voting on Executive Remuneration
227
 
While not mandatory,
228
 all DAX companies have had their 
management board remuneration system approved at least once by their 
general meeting of shareholders since 2010. The general shareholders 
meetings at three firms, BMW, Beiersdorf and Munich Re approved the 
system every year between 2010 and 2012, even though the pay system of 
these companies was not changed in each of those years. Cite. Smaller 
companies are less keen to provide in a shareholder vote: in 2009 and 
2010, 78% of the general meetings of M-DAX companies approved the 
remuneration system, only 42% of the meetings of S-DAX companies and 
63% of the TecDAX companies did so.
229
  
Over this time period, fewer companies have put their executives’ pay 
practices up for a shareholder vote each year. Thus, while 90% of the 
DAX general meetings voted on the remuneration system in 2010, this 
dropped to 47% in 2011, and fell even further to 33% in 2012.
230
 
At the same time, at DAX companies, the average shareholder approval 
rate for the compensation systems decreased between 2010 and 2012 from 
91.6% to 89.9%. In the same vein, in 2010 and 2011, over 75% of 
compensation systems were approved by over 95% of company 
shareholders. However, by 2012, only 40% of companies’ compensation 
systems were approved by more than 95% of the shareholder votes.
231
 
In one important example, in 2010, the shareholders at Heidelberger 
Cement rejected the remuneration system of the company. Several other 
companies have experienced strong opposition to their proposed 
remuneration system, including Deutsche Bank in 2010 (42% opposed),
 232
 
 
 
 227. The data of this section are derived from the publication of DSW, DSW GRAFIKEN 
VERGUETUNGSVOTUM, 2011, available at http://www.dsw-info.de/fileadmin/downloads/Grafiken 
_Verguetungsvotum.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013), and the authors’ own research related to the 
minutes of the 2012 meetings of all of the DAX companies.  
 228. See Part I.F.1.b, supra. 
 229. The M-DAX, S-DAX and TecDAX are the indexes with fifty companies (M-DAX and S-
DAX) or thirty companies (TecDAX) that are representative for the German mid-sized, small-sized 
and technology companies. 
 230. LG München, Mar. 29, 2007, Case No. 5 HK O 12931/06 [AKTG 2007] 458, 2007. 
 231. These data are based on calculations of the DSW reported approval rates for 2010 and 2011 
DSW, STUDIE ZUR VERGÜTUNG DER VORSTÄNDE IN DEN DAX-UND MDAX-UNTERNEHMEN IM 
GESCHÄFTSJAHR 2010, 2011 sheet 11, available at http://www.dsw-info.de/uploads/media/DSW_ 
Verguetungsstudie_Vorstaende_2011_alle_Charts.pdf); and authors’ own research on all minutes of 
the 2012 meetings of DAX companies. 
 232. ISS argued that the opposition at Deutsche Bank was due to the significant increase of the 
base salary and would reduce the variable remuneration with the same amount but failed to specify any 
details on the target levels. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2010 VOTING RESULTS REPORT 
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Deutsche Börse (47% opposed) in 2010, Merck (30% opposed) in 2011 
and SAP (35% opposed) in 2012.  
As a result, Deutsche Bank, Heidelberg Cement and Merck resubmitted 
their remuneration systems for shareholder approval at subsequent general 
shareholder meetings. In response to Deutsche Bank’s efforts to make its 
remuneration system more transparent (but only modestly changing the 
system itself)
233
, its shareholders cast 94% of their votes in favor of the 
plan in 2012. Similarly, Heidelberg Cement developed a new 
remuneration system,
234
 and over 96% of its shareholders approved the 
revised system in 2011. Ironically, Merck added a long-term variable 
compensation component
235
 that actually increased the size of its 
executives’ compensation, but its shareholders’ support for the 
remuneration system went from 70% in 2011 to 87% in 2012. 
Overall, the visible influence of German shareholders’ votes on 
management remuneration systems is modest. Say on Pay is optional, 
though widely employed. When given the chance, shareholders generally 
approve of the remuneration systems and companies that experienced 
significant shareholder opposition against their remuneration system did 
not necessarily change their systems. There were more medium- and long-
term incentive schemes,
236
 resulting in more generous remuneration 
packages,
237
 which are less transparent.
238
 Whether the low levels of 
shareholder opposition are the result of companies having private 
consultations with major institutional investors, as reported in the financial 
press,
239
 is not clear.  
 
 
EUROPE25 (Sept. 16, 2010). Further, the annual report shows that the total remuneration of the 
management board increased from €4.5 million in 2008 to €39 million in 2009. 
 233. The 2012 general meeting notice of Deutsche Bank stated that the minor changes were due to 
new legal requirements (as a result of the transposed European Capital Requirement Directive III). See 
DEUTSCHE BANK, TAGESORDNUNG HAUPTVERSAMMLUNG 2012, at 4, available at https://www. 
deutsche-bank.de/ir/de/download/HV2012_Tagesordnung_de_2304.pdf). 
 234. It moved from a variable bonus based on a specific financial goal and a medium-term bonus 
towards a market competitive short-term bonus and a long term bonus. The short-term bonus is based 
on share of profit and individual targets as key performance indicators (KPI’s). The long-term bonus is 
based for 50% on the three-year earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and return on invested capital 
(ROIC) and for 50% on the four-year total shareholder return related to two indices.  
 235. Merck is organized as a limited partnership with a board of partners that has to approve the 
compensation system and which has delegated its power to a “personnel committee.” 
 236. See AktG, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I, as amended, § 87, para. 1.  
 237. See DELOITTE, INFORMATIONEN FÜR AUFSICHTSRAT UND PRÜFUNGSAUSSCHUSS 2 (2012), 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Germany/Local%20Assets/Documents/13_Focus 
On/Center%20fuer%20Corporate%20Governance/2012/CGF%203-2012_safe.pdf.  
 238. Peter Wilke & Katrin Schmid, Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütung 2011 in den DAX-30-
Unternehmen 46 (Hans Böckler Stiftung Working Paper No. 269, 2012). 
 239. Steve Johnson, Good Governance Delivers Good Value, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, at 4. In 
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In February 2013, in its latest proposed amendments to the corporate 
governance code, the German Corporate Governance Commission 
proposed that the supervisory board set a cap on the amount of total 
compensation awarded to individual management board members as well 
as a cap on the components of this remuneration.
240
 Some commentators 
have suggested tying management pay growth to the level of increases in 
the employees’ salaries.241 The German government has also prepared a 
new proposal that will make Say on Pay binding for listed companies, but 
the German elections of September 2013 stopped the pending legislative 
procedure.
242
  
G. Sweden 
1. Regulatory Framework for Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Remuneration Agreements 
Swedish public limited liability companies must have both a board of 
directors and a managing director. The board of directors must be 
comprised of three members or more.
243
 More than half of the members of 
the board of directors must be elected by the general meeting of 
shareholders. The articles of association can provide for other bodies to 
elect the remaining directors, but this power cannot be delegated to the 
board of directors or one of its members.
244
 Large listed Swedish 
companies commonly have all members of their board of directors elected 
by the shareholders.
245
 In addition to the members elected by the general 
 
 
this interview with the head of corporate governance of Legal & General Investment Management, 
Sacha Sadan it is noted that many corporate governance issues are discussed with this institutional 
investor before the agenda of the general meeting is prepared. 
 240. GOV’T COMM’N OF THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, EXPLANATORY 
COMMENTS ON THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE CODE COMMISSION FROM THE PLENARY MEETINGS 
HELD ON 9 AND 31 JANUARY 2013, at 6 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.dcgk.de/ 
files/dcgk/usercontent/en/download/2013/konsultationsverfahren_2013_02_05/Explanatory_comments
_on_the_changes_proposed_by_the_Code_Commission_from_the_plenary_meetings.pdf (last visited 
May 5, 2013). 
 241. Wilke & Schmid, supra note 238, at 45–46. 
 242. Vernunft und Maß bei Managerbezahlung, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2013/05/2013-05-08-kabinett-aktiengesetz.html; 
see generally DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht, June 26, 2013, BT 
17/14214, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/142/1714214.pdf (last visited July 3, 
2013). 
 243. 8 ch. 46 § AKTIEBOLAGSLAGEN [ABL] [THE SWEDISH COMPANIES ACT] (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 2005:551). 
 244. Id. at 8 ch. 8 §. 
 245. A quick scan of the articles of association of Investor, Tele2, Telia Sonera, Volvo, Swedish 
Match, Electrolux, Securitas proves that none of these companies had other directors that were not 
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meeting of shareholders, the trade unions representing the firm’s workers 
get to elect two or three directors to the board.
246
  
The board of directors of public limited liability companies elects a 
managing director,
247
 who is responsible for the day-to-day management 
of the firm under the guidance of the board of directors.
248
 The managing 
director may also take extraordinary actions if they must be done so 
quickly that she cannot wait for a decision of the board of directors.
249
  
The general meeting of shareholders determines the remuneration of 
the board of directors. Since 2006, unlike in France and Belgium, the 
general meeting of shareholders for Swedish companies sets individual 
director’s fees separately,250 although individual directors are generally 
paid about the same. Like in France and Belgium, the directors receive a 
fixed director’s fee with an additional fee for committee work and a flat 
fee if they serve as chairman of the board.  
In addition, since 2006, the general meeting of shareholders of Swedish 
listed companies casts a binding vote, a “Say on Pay” vote, for or against 
the board of directors’ proposed remuneration guidelines for determining 
the remuneration of the managing director and the company’s senior 
 
 
elected by the general meetings of shareholders or were not employee representatives. ELECTROLUX, 
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF AKTIEBOLAGET ELECTROLUX (COMPANY NO. 556009-4178) art. 6 
(May 8, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/5L5S-6HWR (English), http://perma.cc/7ZHN-GG77 
(Swedish); INVESTOR, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR INVESTOR AB (REG. NO. 556013-8298) § 5 
(Apr. 17, 2012); SECURITAS, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR SECURITAS AB WITH CORPORATE 
IDENTITY NUMBER 556302-7241 § 6 (Jan. 10, 2011); SWEDISH MATCH, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 
SWEDISH MATCH AB (PUBL) CORPORATE REG NO: 556015-0756 § 6 (May 2, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9FWX-ANG2 (English), http://perma.cc/8K7C-L3BK (Swedish); TELE2, ARTICLES OF 
ASSOCIATION TELE2 AB REG. NO 556410-8917 (May 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3VLV-
7DLZ (English), http://perma.cc/996J-5MDN (Swedish); TELIA SONERA, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 
§ 9 (Apr. 6, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/C5R-JKKD; VOLVO, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR 
AB VOLVO § 9 (Apr. 4, 2013). 
 246. The right to elect two directors is provided to the unions if the company (or group) employs 
twenty-five employees or more. If the group employs more than 1000 employees, the Unions can elect 
three directors. 4 § LAG OM STYRELSEREPRESENTATION FÖR DE PRIVATANSTÄLLDA [BOARD 
REPRESENTATION (PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES) ACT] (SFS 1987:1245). 
 247. OECD, BOARD PRACTICES: INCENTIVES AND GOVERNING RISKS 95 (2011), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264113534-en. In private companies a managing director is an optional 
feature. See 8 ch. 27 § ABL. 
 248. Id. at 8 ch. 29 §. According to the Swedish Companies Act the board must develop 
instructions dividing the allocation of power between the board of directors and the managing director. 
Id. at 8 ch. 7 §. 
 249. Id. at 8 ch. 29, 50 §§. Legal doctrine recognizes the difficulty of separating the powers of the 
board of directors and the managing director CARL HEMSTROM, CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 
IN SWEDEN 84 (2011). 
 250. 8 ch. 23(a) § ABL. The board of directors is not permitted to divide a lump sum fee. ROLF, 
SKOG & CATERINA FÄGER, THE SWEDISH COMPANIES ACT 63 (2007). 
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management.
251
 The general meeting of shareholders must vote annually 
on the guidelines to be applied in the current accounting period.  
The Swedish Companies Act provides a number of rules regulating the 
content of the remuneration guidelines. First, the guidelines must be 
forward looking but limited to the period until the next general 
shareholders’ meeting.252 Salary and all other types of compensation must 
be addressed, including the granting and vesting of options and any future 
payment in securities. When the exact amount of the remuneration cannot 
be predetermined, the guidelines must contain information on the nature of 
the compensation as well as the estimated total cost to the company.
253
 
Further, the company has to disclose information on the remuneration that 
has been approved by the board but is not yet payable. Also, the guidelines 
can provide that the board of directors has the right to deviate from these 
guidelines in individual and specific circumstances.
254
 
Conversely, the Companies Act indicates that when the compensation 
package requires the company to issue shares, convertibles or warrants for 
the members of the board, or the managing director, no further guidelines 
must be provided.
255
 The Companies Act itself provides the shareholders 
the right to approve this type of issuance by a supermajority of 90% of the 
represented votes and shares.
256
 The report of the board of directors must 
also provide information about the issuance, including the allotment of the 
shares.
257
  
The Swedish Companies Act states that three weeks before the general 
shareholders meeting, the company’s auditors must provide a report 
certifying that the company complied with the guidelines approved by the 
AGM at the prior general meeting.
258
 If the auditors opine that the 
company did not comply, their report must provide the reasons thereof. 
The Act provides little guidance about the appropriate level of detail 
that must be disclosed in the guidelines submitted to shareholders. 
However, some things can be inferred from the Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code. For example, the Code defines executive pay as: 
“(i) fixed salary or fee, (ii) variable remuneration, including share- and 
share-price-related incentive programs, (iii) pension schemes, and (iv) 
 
 
 251. 7 ch. 61 § ABL. 
 252. Id. at 8 ch. 51 §. 
 253. Id. at 8 ch. 52 §. 
 254. Id. at 8 ch. 53 §. 
 255. Id. at 8 ch. 51 §. 
 256. Id. at 16 ch. 2, 8 §. 
 257. Id. at 16 ch. 10 §. 
 258. Id. at 8 ch. 54 §. 
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other financial benefits.”259 The Corporate Governance Code requires the 
general meeting to approve every kind of allotment of shares to 
executives, executive share-price related incentive schemes, and urges the 
company to provide detailed information on these schemes.
260
 
At public companies, the shareholders also have the right to vote on the 
issuance of shares, warrants or convertible instruments to the board of 
directors, the managing director or employees that involve the suspension 
of the preemption rights of the incumbent shareholders. Such plans require 
the approval of 90% of the votes at a shareholders’ meeting where at least 
90% of the shareholders are present.
261
 This rule makes it difficult to use 
most share-based incentive schemes, although many companies make use 
of alternative mechanisms, like phantom stock. 
There have been some efforts to reduce the level of shareholder input 
on executive remuneration. In 2009, a governmental inquiry recommended 
changing the mandatory “Say on Pay” requirements into a less intrusive 
regulatory comply-or-explain regime, but no action has been taken to 
implement this recommendation thus far.
262
 
2. Assessment of “Say on Pay” in Sweden 
CEO pay is considered moderate in Sweden. In 2005, the average 
CEO’s pay was below $1 million, less than half of their American 
counterpart. The pay package was skewed towards salary, bonus and 
social security contributions, with long-term incentives providing less than 
10% of the total remuneration package.
263
 Since then, pay has increased, 
but a recent survey estimated the average pay of the CEO’s at the twenty-
three largest companies at around 13.5 million Swedish krona (SEK), or 
less than $2 million, of which only one-third consisted of a variable short- 
and long-term incentive pay.
264
 
According to the OECD, several large, listed Swedish companies with 
substantial foreign share ownership have discussed remuneration issues 
 
 
 259. KOD FÜR BOLAGSSTYRNING [SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE] III:9, at 22 n.10.  
 260. Id. at III:9, at 24. 
 261. This rule was introduced because it was found that some issues were taken place in violation 
of the then applicable company law. HEMSTROM, supra note 249, at 41. 
 262. See Per Lekvall, Say on Pay—Pro or Con Good Governance? Some Reflections Based on the 
Swedish Experience, BOARDVIEW,Apr. 2012, at 47–50. 
 263. Randall S. Thomas, International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends 9–10 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 08-26, 2008).  
 264. OECD, BOARD PRACTICES: INCENTIVES AND GOVERNING RISKS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
100, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264113534-en. 
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with these investors.
265
 They found that many foreign investors did not 
want to be involved in the setting of the remuneration package of 
individual executives and therefore relied on proxy advisory firms for 
advice on how to vote their shares. In order to stimulate voter turnout and 
the approval of remuneration policies, Swedish companies have been 
urged to invite foreign investors to participate directly (for example 
through conference calls). Overall, it does not appear that Say on Pay led 
Swedish shareholders to become more actively engaged with their 
companies.
266
  
We examined the remuneration packages of the board of directors, the 
managing director and the top executives of OMX Stockholm thirty 
companies over 2011 to 2012.
267
 In 2011, the chairman of the board at 
these firms received an average payment of 1.784 million SEK
268
 (with a 
median of 1.655 million SEK), with a minimum compensation of 227,000 
SEK and a maximum of 5.454 million SEK.
269
 The remaining members of 
the board of directors elected by the shareholders
270
 were remunerated 
with a mean director’s fee of 615,000 SEK (with a median of 587,000 
SEK). One company paid 1.130 million SEK to each individual director, 
while the average director of one large bank only received 91,000 SEK.
271
  
In 2011, the mean CEO remuneration package was 18.8 million SEK. 
These packages ranged from a maximum of 38.54 million SEK for the 
CEO of a medical technology company to a minimum of 1.751 million 
SEK for the CEO of an oil company.
272
 On average, half of the 
remuneration package is the fixed wage (median 46%), while the short 
term bonus contributed less than 20% of the total pay (both mean and 
median). Average pension contributions are considerable with a mean of 
21% of total pay and a median of 18.5%. Company disclosures do not split 
 
 
 265. Id. at 105–06. 
 266. See id. at 106, 109. 
 267. There are twenty-six companies in our sample. Nokia, ABB and Astra Zeneca are considered 
as foreign companies, Atlas Copco counts as two in the index (shares A and B). For these companies, 
the average number of board members is eleven with a mean of 8.9 directors elected by the 
shareholders and 2.1 directors elected by the employees. 
 268. The mean values include the additional remuneration for memberships and chairmanships of 
committees in the board. 
 269. The chairman of Skania is also senior executive of Volkswagen and is not remunerated for 
his chairmanship of Skania. 
 270. The chief executive officer who generally does not receive a remuneration as director is the 
sole exception. 
 271. Employee directors are not separately remunerated. 
 272. Authors’ own research based on companies’ annual reports and websites (May 2013) referred 
to supra note 267 (on file with authors). 
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the costs of long-term benefits, but the total amounts of long-term benefits 
vary between 0 SEK and 8 million SEK.  
This data shows that in Sweden the cross-company differences in pay 
packages are relatively low in comparison with other countries. The 
absolute amounts are nearly as high as those paid in some other countries. 
Perhaps as a consequence, shareholder opposition to company’s 
remuneration guidelines, or the individual remuneration package of 
directors, is relatively modest. According to ISS, shareholder approval 
rates for the remuneration guidelines were 89.1% in 2010 and 99.3% in 
2011. For share incentive schemes, the approval rates were 98.4% in 2010 
and 99.8% in 2011. By comparison, the average approval rates in other 
European countries are generally lower.
273
  
The one exceptional case arose in 2010 when the Swedish government 
voted its 37% block of shares in TeliaSonera against the company’s 
remuneration guidelines because they contained a variable pay element.
274
 
As a result of the Swedish government’s actions, the voting guidelines of 
TeliaSonera were rejected by 52% of its shareholders and the TeliaSonera 
board of directors had to renegotiate all of its executive employment 
contracts.
275
  
While Swedish companies give detailed disclosures of their directors’ 
remuneration in the minutes of the general meeting of shareholders, they 
provide little information about shareholder turnout and the voting results 
at the meeting. The minutes of the meeting seldom contain the number of 
shareholders that were present and the number of votes cast at the meeting. 
Companies only disclose that the agenda items were approved with the 
required majority, which is generally 50%. An exception to this rule is 
Lundin Petroleum, which discloses in the appendices of its report the 
voting record of all shareholders. In its case, the remuneration of the board 
of directors as well as the remuneration guidelines were approved by a 
large majority of the shareholders, although a number of foreign pension 
funds and some asset managers voted against them.
276
 
 
 
 273. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2010 VOTING RESULTS REPORT EUROPE 22–23 (Sept. 16, 
2010): INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2010 VOTING RESULTS REPORT EUROPE15–16 (2011). The 
exception is 2010 when the European average was 93.3%. In that year, the lower average outcome for 
Sweden was due to the disapproval of the remuneration guidelines of TeliaSonera.  
 274. The Swedish government had banned the use of variable executive pay in wholly owned and 
partially owned Swedish companies in 2009. 
 275. For a more detailed analysis of this case, see Lekvall, supra note 262, at 47–49 n.4. 
 276. Minutes Recorded at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (Lundin Petroleum, 
Stockholm, Swed.), May 10, 2012, http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/Documents/ot_AGMminutes 
2012_eng.pdf. 
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H. The Netherlands 
1. Regulatory Framework of the Dutch Board Structure and 
Remuneration Arrangements 
Since January 1, 2013, Dutch public limited liability companies are 
free to choose between a one-tier and a two-tier board.
277
 Before the 
enactment of this law, large Dutch companies had to provide a two-tier 
board structure with a management board and a supervisory board. While 
there is already a trend visible towards the one-tier board structure,
278
 the 
large majority of the Dutch stock exchange listed companies still have 
two-tier boards. Consequently, we briefly address the remuneration 
arrangements of companies with a two-tier structure first and then discuss 
the differences for the one-tier board structure.  
a. The Two-Tier Board Structure  
Dutch listed corporations typically have a two-tier board structure.
279
 
The management board is responsible for the day-to-day business and 
affairs of the company.
280
 The supervisory board’s role is to supervise and 
advise the management board as well as to monitor the general course of 
the company’s affairs.281 In addition, the supervisory board chairs the 
general meeting of shareholders and is charged with hiring and firing the 
members of the management board.
282
  
 
 
 277. Wet van 6 juni 2011 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de 
aanpassing van regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten vennootschappen [Law of June 
6, 2011 Changing Book 2 Civil Code Related to the Amendments of the Rules on Governance and 
Supervision of Public and Private Limited Liability Companies], Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden [Stb.] [Official Gazette of the Netherlands], no. 275 YES, 2011, p. 1.  
 278. According to Eumedion, nine Dutch listed companies had opted for the one-tier board 
structure at the end of June 2013. Nieuwsbrief, EUMEDION, July 2013, at 6, available at 
http://www.eumedion.nl/nl/public/kennisbank/nieuwsbrieven/2013/nieuwsbrief_2013-06.pdf. 
Companies with dual listings or internationally operating companies, like Unilever or Kardan, opted 
for the one-tier board structure, as well as Douwe Egberts after the division from Sarah Lee, the 
American parent company. 
 279. This two-tier structure was mandatory only for a number of (large) companies, as the old 
regime provided exemptions for companies with mainly international activities. Many companies 
opt(ed) voluntarily for the two-tier structure. An analysis of the different types of two-tier structures 
goes beyond the purpose of this contribution. 
 280. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil code], bk. 2: 129, ¶ 1. 
 281. Id. at bk. 2: 140. 
 282. In fact, in a two-tier board, the appointment of a management director takes three steps. The 
general meeting is informed of the proposed appointment. The employee’s council is requested to 
provide an opinion and the supervisory board appoints the director. 
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The general meeting of shareholders appoints the members of the 
supervisory board. The supervisory board must disclose its composition, 
size and the required expertise of its members.
283
 Furthermore, the 
employees’ council284 has the binding right to nominate one-third of the 
members of the supervisory board. Supervisory board members are elected 
for a term of four years.  
b. The One-Tier Board Structure 
If a company selects a one-tier board, that board must be composed of 
both nonexecutive and executive members. Whether a particular candidate 
will be elected as a nonexecutive or executive board member is decided by 
the general meeting of shareholders.
285
  
The Dutch Civil Code provides that the nonexecutive members of the 
board must monitor the performance of the executive members. Further, 
the chairman must be a nonexecutive member of the board of directors. In 
matters related to the executive compensation, all of the executive 
members of the board are prohibited from being involved in the decision 
making process as well as in the setting of their remuneration.
286
  
2. Executive Remuneration  
Article 135 and article 145 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code detail 
which decision makers determine the amounts of executive remuneration 
and the company’s remuneration policies.287 Article 135 requires 
companies to develop a remuneration policy for the management board. 
The law does not indicate which corporate body must develop this 
remuneration policy. In the Dutch corporate governance code, it is 
considered a best practice that the supervisory board drafts the 
remuneration policy.
288
 Companies are allowed to depart from this 
 
 
 283. BW bk. 2: 158, ¶ 3.  
 284. Companies that employ at least fifty employees must establish an employees’ council. This 
council is composed of employees’ representatives. The number of representatives lies between three 
and twenty-five, depending on the total number of employees. Article 6 of the Wet op de 
Ondernemingsraden van 28 januari 1971 [Law of 28 January 1971 on the Employees Council], Stb. 
1971, p. 1.  
 285. BW, bk. 2: 132. 
 286. Id. at bk. 2: 129a. 
 287. Since 2004, Dutch listed companies must include in their annual report a description of the 
application of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code provisions. Id. at bk. 2: 391, ¶ 3. 
 288. It remains unclear who should draft the remuneration policy in case the company is 
organized with a one-tier board. The Corporate Governance Commission clarified that “the provisions 
that apply to supervisory directors should be immediately applied to non-executive directors in one-tier 
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practice, but if they do so, they must explain the reasons therefore.
289
 The 
proposed remuneration policy is also sent to the employees’ council. The 
employees’ council may provide the general meeting of shareholders with 
its opinion on the policy at the general meeting of shareholders.
290
 The 
policy is then voted on at the general meeting of shareholders, which must 
approve it in order for it to become effective.
291
  
If the remuneration policy for management board directors is to be 
amended, it must be re-approved by the general meeting of shareholders. 
Unfortunately, the law is silent on what constitutes an “amendment,” 
which has led to debates about what changes are significant enough to 
require shareholder approval.
292
 The law is also silent about whether the 
general meeting of shareholders has the power to amend the proposed 
remuneration policy itself.  
The general meeting of shareholders must approve the individual 
remuneration packages of each management board member unless the 
articles of association delegate this power to another decision maker. 
Commonly, the articles of association delegate this power to the 
supervisory board so that it is unusual for individual remuneration 
packages to be voted on by the general meeting of shareholders.  
However, the general meeting of shareholders often votes on parts of 
the individual pay packages for management board members. For 
example, if the individual director’s compensation package contains any 
share-based remuneration, this item of the individual remuneration 
proposal must be submitted for shareholder approval.
293
 In addition, the 
 
 
boards, with no prejudice to the other responsibilities of these non-executives.” CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE MONITORING COMM., FOURTH REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DUTCH 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 14 (2012), available at http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/ 
monitoring-reports. It leaves the question whether the provisions that apply to the supervisory board, 
like developing the remuneration policy, should be applied by the nonexecutive directors jointly acting 
or by the board of directors including the executive directors.  
 289. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE MONITORING COMM., DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE: PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BEST PRACTICE PROVISIONS II.2.12 
(2008), available at www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl, archived at http://perma.cc/4U29-RH9K.  
 290. BW, bk. 2: 135, ¶ 2. 
 291. The Dutch corporate governance code prescribes as a best practice that the supervisory board 
provide a “scenario analyses carried out and with due regard for the pay differentials within the 
enterprise” when it determines “the level and structure of the remuneration of the management board 
members” and must “analyse the possible outcomes of the variable remuneration components and how 
they may affect the remuneration of the management board members” before drafting the 
remuneration policy. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE MONITORING COMM., supra note 289, at II.2.1, 
II.2.2. 
 292. See EUMEDION, EVALUATIE AVA-SEIZOEN 9–10 (2012), available at http://www.eumedion. 
nl/nl/public/kennisbank/ava-evaluaties/2012_ava-evaluatie.pdf (last visited July 10, 2013). 
 293. BW, bk. 2: 135, ¶ 4. 
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proposal must provide information on the maximum number of shares or 
options that can be granted to the board as well as the criteria for granting. 
Notwithstanding the shareholder meeting’s approval right, the corporate 
body that contracts with the candidate-director can validly represent the 
company even if the approval is missing or the granting is disapproved.  
Furthermore, the Dutch Parliament recently approved the law to 
provide for claw-back provisions for bonus awards that have been granted 
based on incorrect information. Under the terms of this law, a 
representative elected by the general meeting of shareholders, or another 
body specified in the articles of association, will have the right to modify 
the bonus if it is determined to be unreasonable and unfair.
294
 This 
provision was already incorporated in the corporate governance code as a 
best practice.
295
  
Finally, article 145 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the 
general meeting of shareholders can fix the compensation of the members 
of the supervisory board. It is common practice that the supervisory board 
proposes a fixed, flat cash compensation payment for each member of the 
board, which is then submitted to the company’s general meeting of 
shareholders for approval.  
3. Assessment of Say on Pay 
Since 2005, the general meeting of shareholders must approve the 
company’s remuneration policy and any amendments to this policy.296 
Using this vote, shareholders can exert substantial influence on a listed 
company’s remuneration policy. The intensity of shareholder 
consideration of remuneration policies is revealed in the minutes of the 
meeting of many companies. These minutes show that corporate 
remuneration policies, as well as individual management director 
remuneration packages, are regularly and heavily debated, although actual 
rejections of either of them are rare. A more recent phenomenon is the 
voting against the discharging of the supervisory board members when the 
 
 
 294. Wet van 11 december 2013 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet 
op het financieel toezicht in verband met de bevoegdheid tot aanpassing en terugvordering van 
bonussen en winstdelingen van bestuurders en dagelijks beleidsbepalers [Law of December 2013 
Changing Book 2 Civil Code and the Law of Financial Supervision Related to the Power to Modify 
and Claw Back of Bonuses of Directors and Executive Officers], Stb. 2013, no. 563YES, p. 1. 
 295. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE MONITORING COMM., supra note 289, at II.2.10.  
 296. The version of article 135 that requires the general meeting of shareholders to approve the 
remuneration policy was enacted in Wet van 9 juli 2004 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk 
Wetboek in verband met aanpassing van de structuurregeling [Law of 9 July 2004 to Amend Book 2 of 
the Civil Code Related to the Structure Regime], Stb. 2004, p. 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
704 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:653 
 
 
 
 
discretionary power of this board to change—i.e., lower—the performance 
criteria of the remuneration package of the management board 
members.
297
 
Every year, Eumedion
298
 reports on the developments at general 
meetings of shareholders. The remuneration policy is one of the 
governance items that Eumedion regularly addresses in its reports to its 
institutional investor clients. Since 2008, Eumedion has identified several 
trends in the participation of shareholders in the remuneration debate.
299
  
First, shareholders generally do not strongly oppose companies over 
their remuneration policies. Table 2 below shows the eleven remuneration 
votes that generated the highest levels of shareholder opposition at general 
meetings of AEX companies between 2008 and 2012.
300
 Generally, it 
appears that shareholders consider company-specific arguments when 
voting. In particular, when the performance criteria for variable pay are 
insufficiently detailed or perceived by shareholders to be too generous, 
many shareholders will vote against the remuneration policy, or the 
remuneration item.  
Since 2011, Eumedion also reports the recommendations of the third 
party voting advisor ISS, and additionally in 2012 those of a second proxy 
voting advisor, Glass Lewis. As Table 2 shows, there were three 
remuneration issues where ISS issued a negative recommendation on the 
proposal. However, Eumedion reports that, in 2012, in thirty-one out of 
forty-six highly contested agenda items (67%) both ISS and Glass Lewis 
supported the companies’ proposals, while an additional nine (19.5%) 
more were only opposed by one of these proxy advisors. Based on these 
results, Eumedion argues that the impact of the proxy advisors’ voting 
recommendation does not appear to determine the outcome of the 
shareholder vote.
301
   
 
 
 297. A large majority of the minority shareholders disapproved this change by the supervisory 
board of Heineken. Other cases are reported by Eumedion, EUMEDION, EVALUATIE AVA-SEIZOEN 14 
(2014), available at http://www.eumedion.nl/nl/public/kennisbank/ava-evaluaties/2014-ava-evaluatie. 
pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
 298. Eumedion represents approximately seventy institutional investors, managing more than €1 
trillion in assets, and its major goals are to enhance corporate governance, environmental and social 
performance and strategy. For more information, see Corporate Governance Forum, EUMEDION, 
www.eumedion.nl.  
 299. EUMEDION, supra note 292. 
 300. These are taken from Eumedion’s yearly top ten lists of opposed items. 
 301. EUMEDION, supra note 292, at 13.  
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TABLE 2: REMUNERATION ITEMS AMONGST TOP 10 OPPOSITION ITEMS 
AT AEX AGMS 2008–2012 
Company Year Voting item Against W/hold Result ISS rec. 
Philips 2008 Change LTIP 57.8 5.2 Rejected 
 
Shell 2008 Granting retention bonus 23.5 25.9 Accepted 
 
SBM Offshore 2008 Changing remuneration policy 41.1 4.5 Accepted 
 
Shell 2009 Remuneration report 57.1 3.9 Rejected 
 
ASML 2009 Right to issue ‘sign on’ shares 41.1 0.3 Accepted 
 
ASML 2009 Right to issue ‘sign on’ options 0.8 28.7 Accepted 
 
Heineken 2010 Changing remuneration policy 17.6 0.4 Accepted 
 
Heineken 2010 Changing LTIP 16.6 0.4 Accepted 
 
ING 2011 Changing remuneration policy 43.2 
 
Accepted Against 
Aegon 2011 Changing remuneration policy 30.3 
 
Accepted Against 
TNT Express 2012 Remuneration superv. board 30.1 
 
Accepted Against 
Source: Eumedion, Evaluatie AVA Seizoen, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. (www.eumedion.nl). 
Table 2 emphasizes the remuneration items that experienced significant 
opposition. However, the general level of voting disapproval of the 
remuneration policy is much lower. We studied all remuneration related 
issues at the general meetings of AEX companies in 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
These results are in Table 3.  
TABLE 3: APPROVAL OF REMUNERATION ITEMS AT AGMS OF AEX 
COMPANIES IN 2010, 2011 AND 2012 
 
2010 2011 2012 All 
Avg. approval rate 96.58 86.42 87.97 91.46 
Remuneration policy 95.58 83.00 88.97 89.52 
Other pay issues 97.25 89.41 86.71 92.88 
Total number items 20 15 9 44 
Source: Authors’ research based on the minutes of the general meetings of AEX companies  
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The 2010 results are distorted by the 2008 changes to the Dutch 
corporate governance code that led many companies’ boards to reconsider 
their remuneration policy in 2009, which then had to be approved at the 
2010 AGM. As the amended policies were changed only to reflect new 
best practice amendments, shareholder approval rates were unusually high.  
The amendments to remuneration policies in 2011 and 2012 are more 
representative as they involved company-specific factors. For these years, 
we see higher levels of shareholder opposition, although the mean 
opposing rate is still significantly lower than the disapproval levels that 
were reported in Table 2. In results not tabulated, we find that there are no 
statistically significant differences between the approval rates of corporate 
remuneration policies versus those for all other remuneration items, like 
the approval of long term investment plans, bonus shares, etc. 
What these tables do not show are several remuneration agenda items 
that have been withdrawn before a shareholder vote. Eumedion provides 
evidence that many (institutional) shareholders perform a detailed study of 
the agenda of the meeting, including the proposal to change the 
remuneration policy, or other remuneration related proposals, and then 
contact the company before the general meeting takes place to express 
their displeasure. In cases in which the management board of directors and 
supervisory board believe that the shareholder opposition against the item 
is very significant, the board may withdraw the item from the shareholder 
meeting’s agenda. Eumedion believes that this practice creates a healthy 
dialogue between the remuneration committee and the shareholders that 
helps to identify the sensitivity of remuneration items earlier so that the 
company can avoid having to withdraw highly opposed agenda items.
302
  
Dutch law contains some ambiguities on the appropriate Say on Pay 
framework that require some further legislative consideration. First, as we 
discussed above, material changes to a company’s remuneration policy 
must be approved by the shareholders. There remains significant debate as 
to the meaning of “material”. For example, one company asked its AGM 
to approve a change of its peer group that it used in determining the short- 
and long-term management bonuses, while another company decided that 
the supervisory board could make changes to the composition of the peer 
group without asking the company’s shareholders.303 Second, many 
shareholders complain that companies need to disclose more information, 
particularly about performance-based remuneration packages and the 
 
 
 302. EUMEDION, EVALUATIE AVA-SEIZOEN 10 (2008). 
 303. Id. at 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] SAY ON PAY AROUND THE WORLD 707 
 
 
 
 
discretionary power of the supervisory board over how it will execute an 
approved policy.  
Finally, remuneration policies need regular modifications to reflect 
changes in circumstances. For example, while during the beginning of the 
2000s many companies used total shareholder return as the most important 
performance measure for bonuses, recently they have moved to more 
general performance-based measures like corporate social responsibility, 
sustainable development, etc.
304
 This change in metrics will necessitate a 
new remuneration policy vote. 
New regulatory or legislative initiatives may also create a need to 
modify remuneration policies. This would be the case for banks, as they 
needed to amend their remuneration policies to align the short- and long-
term bonus schemes with the transposed provision of the Capital 
Requirements Directive III.
305
 Another example would be that many 
companies introduced claw-back provisions for bonuses into their policies 
to comply with best practices as set forth in the Dutch corporate 
governance code,
306
 which recently became law.  
I. Summary of Countries’ Different Features  
Table 4 below summarizes the board structures and overall shareholder 
voting rules for the eight countries discussed above. We can see several 
important differences. First, board structure matters: in countries with two-
tier boards, historically the supervisory board usurped a number of powers 
generally assigned to the shareholders in a one-tier board structure. Most 
importantly for our purposes, is that one of the assigned powers to the 
supervisory board was the setting of the remuneration of management 
board members. Recent developments in the two-tier regime countries 
seem to reassign the power to set the remuneration (policy) back to the 
shareholders. 
Second, the contours of “Say on Pay” vary significantly across 
countries. The gamut of regimes runs from setting the individual pay 
package of (executive) directors in the U.S. to advising the remuneration 
policy in Sweden to voting on the remuneration report in the U.K. and 
Belgium. In this setting, shareholders of Swedish companies set the future 
in corporate pay packages, while the British shareholders must be satisfied 
with the approval of “past” remuneration schemes.  
 
 
 304. EUMEDION, EVALUATIE AVA-SEIZOEN 10 (2011). 
 305. This has been overruled by the 2013 CRD IV Directive. 
 306. EUMEDION, EVALUATIE AVA-SEIZOEN 5–6 (2010). 
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Third, in most countries, shareholder votes on executive remuneration 
matters advise the board of directors in its development of appropriate 
incentivizing schemes of executive directors, while other countries 
empower the general meeting of shareholders to bindingly set the 
remuneration (policy). Fourth, “Say on Pay” sometimes means “Say on 
Individual Pay” while in other countries it means “Say on Group Pay.” For 
example, most German companies provide shareholders with an advisory 
vote of the remuneration system of the management board, but it belongs 
to the powers of the supervisory board to set the individual remuneration 
package of a management board member. In comparison, at Swedish 
companies the remuneration package of directors is determined 
individually. Finally, “Say on Pay” is not always an annual experience: 
under American law, it can take up to three years before a shareholder can 
have her say, whereas in the Netherlands, it can even take longer if the 
previously approved policy remains unchanged.  
The many differences between the different “Say on Pay” regimes 
complicate the choices facing policy makers in the individual countries. 
The development of a European “Say on Pay” regime illustrates the 
difficulties. For nonfinancial companies, the European regulatory 
framework is evolving at a slow pace. In April 2011, the European 
Commission issued a green paper on the future of the EU corporate 
governance framework.
307
 One of the questions that were raised concerned 
“Say on Pay.” It asked: “Should it be mandatory to put the remuneration 
policy and the remuneration report to a vote by shareholders?” This 
question offered only limited degrees of differentiation for respondents 
since it was limited to a mandatory vote on both the corporate 
remuneration policy and the remuneration report. A small majority of the 
respondents to the questionnaire supported holding a mandatory vote but 
only of an advisory nature.
308
 Their answers unfortunately provided no 
indication as to whether they preferred forward looking Say on Pay (a vote 
on the remuneration policy) or backward looking Say on Pay (a vote on 
the remuneration report).  
 
 
 307. Commission Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance Framework, at 23, COM (2011) 
164 final (Apr. 5, 2011). The Action Plan follows on two Commission’s recommendations and follow-
up reports on the remuneration of the board of directors in which a vote on say on pay was 
recommended. Commission Recommendation 2004/913 of 14 December 2004 Fostering an 
Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies, O.J. (L 385) 55–59 (EC); 
Commission Recommendation 2009/384 of 30 April 2009 on Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Services Sector, O.J. (L 120) 22–27 (EC).  
 308. Feedback Statement—Summary of Responses to the Commission Green Paper on the EU 
Corporate Governance Framework, 10 (2011). 
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In its December 2012 Communication,
309
 the European Commission 
revealed that it would make a shareholder vote on both the remuneration 
report and the remuneration policy mandatory,
310
 probably through a 
modification of the Shareholder Rights Directive.
311
 At the same time, the 
Commission would enhance the accountability of the shareholders vis-à-
vis the company through the introduction of disclosure requirements for 
institutional investors.
312
 Also, it would assess if the institutional investor’s 
use of proxy advisor’s voting services can sufficiently take into 
consideration the idiosyncratic characteristics of European listed 
companies in particular regarding the remuneration policy.
313
 In April 
2014 this proposal for a European Directive was issued.
314
 The European 
Commission proposes to have the remuneration policy of public listed 
entities “as regards directors” approved by the shareholders at least every 
three years. The remuneration report with detailed information on the 
remuneration package of directors should every year be a voting item of 
the general meeting of shareholders.
315
 This proposal will be heavily 
debated in the upcoming period and it is far from sure the amendments to 
the Shareholder Rights Directive will be approved.  
 
 
 309. Communication of the Commission: Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate 
Governance—A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable 
Companies, at 18, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012). 
 310. Id. at 9. 
 311. Directive 2007/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17–24 (EC).  
 312. Communication of the Commission, supra note 309, at 8. 
 313. Id. at 10. 
 314. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder 
Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance 
Statement, COM (2014) 213 final (May 9, 2014), available at eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 
TXT/?uri=COM:2014:2013:FIN. 
 315. Id. art. 9a, art. 9b. 
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II. WHY IS SAY ON PAY BEING ADOPTED?  
A. Diverse Versus Concentrated Ownership Patterns  
One factor that may influence the adoption of Say on Pay in a country 
is whether the predominant form of ownership structure is diverse or 
concentrated. The U.S., the U.K., and to a lesser extent Australia, are good 
examples of dispersed-ownership systems. At publicly traded corporations 
with highly dispersed share ownership, managerial agency costs are an 
important problem, but shareholder monitoring has historically been weak 
because of collective action problems.
 316
 These managerial agency costs 
may be reduced if we can align managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
through the use of stock options and long term incentive pay. U.S. and 
U.K. firms rely on incentive pay systems to more closely align the 
interests of managers and shareholders.
317
 Australian executives also 
receive substantial amounts of restricted stock and stock options.
318
  
From the perspective of corporate executives, however, substituting 
stock options or restricted stock for other forms of fixed compensation 
increases the riskiness of their pay package, especially when stringent 
corporate performance conditions are attached to these awards. In response 
to the greater risk, managers discount substantially the value of 
performance-based pay awards.
319
 To keep pay levels at a specified 
amount, companies must, for example, offer more stock options to 
compensate for the higher risks of little or no return if the options fail to 
pay off.  
Reflecting their views on the tradeoff between improved alignment of 
incentives and higher costs, institutional shareholders in American and 
U.K. firms have generally been content to see executive pay rise 
substantially so long as the increase has been incentive-oriented.
320
 In the 
post-financial crisis era, however, institutional investors have become 
 
 
 316. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 308, 312. 
 317. Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan 
via Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 5, 14–15, 17 (1999).  
 318. Randall S. Thomas, Lessons from the Rapid Evolution of Executive Remuneration Practices 
in Australia: Hard Law, Soft Law, Boards and Consultants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE 
PAY, supra note 2, at 341, 350–51. 
 319. See, e.g., Brian Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4–5 (2002); Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: 
Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, FIN. MGMT., Summer 2001, at 5. 
 320. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 294, 312 (noting that British shareholders might be 
more prepared to take a stand against high pay arrangements than American investors).  
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more critical of high executive pay levels at firms that are performing 
poorly.
321
 
  
Say on Pay voting systems in diffuse ownership countries give 
investors a mechanism for drawing attention to their concerns about 
excess, or poorly structured, incentive pay. If corporate boards make pay 
awards that are out of line with corporate performance, or with those given 
to executives at comparable firms in similar industries, the firm risks a 
“failed” Say on Pay vote and the resulting negative attention that is 
focused on its directors in the aftermath of such a vote. In extreme cases, a 
board’s failure to respond appropriately to a weak Say on Pay vote may 
also attract the attention of an activist hedge fund, as may have occurred 
recently at Hess Oil.
322
 
In Continental Europe, where concentrated share ownership was, or is, 
the norm, Say on Pay may be less important as a means of mobilizing 
shareholder opposition against high executive pay levels. In these 
countries, control is concentrated in the hands of a shareholder group, 
which therefore can discipline ineffective managers,
323
 so that incentive 
pay systems are less important and executive pay levels are 
correspondingly lower.
324
 Overall pay for performance levels will be 
lower, and the use of stock options less common, than in dispersed-
ownership countries. Studies by Brunello,
325
 Ramaswamy, Veliyath, and 
Gomes,
326
 and Park, Nelson, and Torabzadeh,
327
 provide empirical 
evidence from Canada, India, and Italy, which supports these claims. 
If ownership concentration levels should decline, however, it is likely 
that executive pay levels and performance-based compensation will 
increase in the future as a means of aligning managers’ incentives with 
those of the shareholders. This stronger alignment may offset the loss of 
monitoring when the control shareholder disappears. This is particularly 
likely if the cause of increased dispersion is growing levels of foreign 
 
 
 321. Thomas et al., supra note 6. 
 322. Daniel Gilbert & Joann S. Lublin, Board Pay Fuels Hess Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2013, 
at B8. 
 323. Brian R. Cheffins, Minority Shareholders and Corporate Governance, COMPANY LAW., Feb. 
2000, at 41. 
 324. Todd T. Milbourn, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance 154 J. INST’L & 
THEORETIC’L ECON. 170, 174 (1998).  
 325. Giorgio Brunello et al., Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Italy, 19 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 133, 141, 155 (2001). 
 326. Kannan Ramaswamy et al., A Study of the Determinants of CEO Compensation in India, 40 
MGMT. INT’L REV. 167, 182–83 (2000). 
 327. Yun W. Park et al., Controlling Shareholder and Executive Incentive Structure: Canadian 
Evidence, 17 CAN. J. ADMIN. SCI. 245, 246 (2000). 
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portfolio investment by U.S. and U.K. institutional investors.
328
 Consistent 
with this thesis, Thomas finds some evidence that over time, shareholder 
ownership in Sweden and Germany has become less concentrated and 
executive incentive compensation (and overall pay levels) is rising.
329
  
For instance, traditionally corporate control in Sweden has been 
heavily concentrated in the hands of one or two family shareholders
330
: as 
of 1998, in listed Swedish companies, on average, the largest shareholder 
controlled 38% of the voting rights, which in practice implied operational 
control of the company.
331
 However, in recent years, share ownership in 
Sweden has become more dispersed in part because of a new Swedish 
pension model that has created large state-controlled and corporatist 
pension funds that have invested heavily in Swedish firms.
332
 Foreign 
investment also has increased dramatically—in the early 1990s, foreign 
investors owned less than 10% of Swedish listed companies’ stock, 
whereas by 2012 foreign ownership of Swedish shares rose to 40.3% of all 
shares.
333
 Amongst the foreign investors, American institutions were the 
largest single group, holding roughly 29% of the total equity of Swedish 
companies. As a result, commentators predict that Swedish firms’ 
formerly concentrated family ownership model will likely give way to 
more dispersed ownership by foreign owners and state or corporate 
pension funds.
 334
  
Executive pay is likely to be affected by these changes. Previously, 
concentrated ownership reduced the level of CEO compensation in 
Swedish and Norwegian firms because large owners are better at 
 
 
 328. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the 
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 213, 
234 (1999); Mary O’Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 167 (2000).  
 329. Randall S. Thomas, International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends, in 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 197–98 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Seth D. Harris 
& Orly Lobel eds., 2009). 
 330. Magnus Henrekson
 
& Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish Model of Corporate Ownership and 
Control in Transition in WHO WILL OWN EUROPE? THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ASSET 
OWNERSHIP IN EUROPE (Harry Huizinga & Lars Jonung eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998256. 
 331. Id. at 27. In 34% of the firms, the controlling owner had more than 50% of the votes, while in 
82% of the firms, there was a well-defined owner holding more than 25% of the votes. Id. 
 332. Id. at 1.  
 333. Officiella Statistik, Aktiägande i Bolag Noterade pa Svensk Marknadsplats, STATISTIKA 
MEDELLANDEN (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.scb.se/Statistik/FM/FM0201/2012H02/FM0201 
_2012H02_SM_FM20SM1301.pdf. 
 334. Henrekson
 
& Jakobsson, supra note 330, at 34. 
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monitoring CEOs directly.
335
 Today, however, we are moving towards a 
more dispersed ownership in public corporations which could lead to 
increased remuneration because of decreased control shareholder 
monitoring of pay levels. This suggests a potential need for new 
monitoring mechanisms for shareholders in Sweden. Perhaps this is why, 
as ownership concentration levels dropped, and executive pay levels 
escalated, Sweden enacted binding Say on Pay legislation. 
Many German public companies have experienced similar shifts in 
their shareholder composition over the last decade. In the past, the largest 
German companies were controlled by domestic investors, banks, 
insurance companies and families.
336
 In addition, the state controlled 
important German companies, such as the Deutsche Post and Deutsche 
Telekom.
337
 Today things have changed: 53% of the shares on the DAX, 
the stock index for the thirty largest German companies, are in foreign 
hands.
338
 Moreover, there has been a significant decrease in ownership 
concentration levels since 2000: the largest shareholder’s average voting 
block at a DAX-30 company decreased from 26.4% in 1999 to 20.4% in 
2012.
339
 This resembles the ownership concentration levels found in the 
UK.
340
 Finally, only four companies are still majority controlled, while 
one-half of the DAX companies have no shareholders owning more than 
10% of the voting rights.
341
  
Concentrated ownership by banks, all other things being equal, is 
associated with lower levels of CEO compensation at German 
companies.
342
 Pay-for-performance sensitivities are very low and 
 
 
 335. Lars Oxelheim & Trond Randøy, The Anglo-American Financial Influence on CEO 
Compensation in Non-Anglo-American Firms, 36 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 470 (2005). 
 336. WOLFGANG STREECK & MARTIN HÖPNER, ALLE MACHT DEM MARKT? FALLSTUDIEN ZUR 
ABWICKLUNG DER DEUTSCHLAND AG 120 (Martin Höpner ed., 2003). 
 337. Id. at 120. 
 338. Thomas, supra note 329, at 198. The DAX measures the performance of the Prime 
Standard’s thirty largest German companies in terms of order book volume and market capitalization. 
DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/isg/gdb_navigation/home? 
active=overview&timespan=1d&wpbpl=&wp=DE0008469008&foldertype=_Index&wplist=DE00084
69008&module=InOverview_Index. 
 339. Christoph Van der Elst, The Influence of Shareholder Rights on Shareholder Behavior, 5 
CORP. FIN. & CAP. MKTS. L. REV. 50, 56 (2010); authors’ own research based on companies’ annual 
reports and websites (May 2013) (on file with authors). 
 340. In 2007, the average voting block of a sample of UK companies was 19% of the votes. C. 
Van der Elst, Shareholder Mobility in Five European Countries, in CORPORATE MANAGEMENT: 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 211 (L. Padmavathi ed., 2009). 
 341. Authors’ own research based on companies annual reports and websites (May 2013) (on file 
with authors). 
 342. Alfred Haid & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation in 
Germany 15, 19 (Working Paper 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948926. Interestingly, 
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concentrated ownership reduces them still further.
343
 Conversely, as 
ownership concentration disperses, we should expect to see higher levels 
of executive compensation. As an example, the mean compensation of a 
member of the management board of a DAX company soared from €1.2 
million in 2001 to over €3.0 million in 2013, an increase of over 250%, 
whereas the average annual wage for workers increased only 18% during 
the same period.
344
 
As ownership concentration levels have dropped in Germany, the 
country has also moved to give shareholders more “say” about executive 
pay. The Law on the Appropriateness of Director Compensation states that 
the general meeting of shareholders can be provided an advisory vote of 
the remuneration system of the management board of listed companies.
345
 
Further, institutional investors make use of advisory Say on Pay votes to 
signal their worries over pay increases.
346
 
Recently, in the aftermath of several pay scandals, as well as 
Switzerland’s popular referendum in support of a binding Say on Pay vote 
for Swiss firms, there has been strong pressure on the government to 
introduce a binding Say on Pay vote in Germany. The German 
government wants to move “Say on pay for listed companies to a 
mandatory system [that will be] . . . binding for the supervisory board.”347 
For some members of the German Parliament, these new proposals are 
insufficient: they want to limit directly executive pay to a maximum of a 
fixed multiple of the ratio of the total pay of a member of the management 
board to the average remuneration of the employees of the company. This 
cap would be binding, and would have to be determined by the 
supervisory board and disclosed in the company’s annual report to its 
shareholders.
348
  
 
 
family ownership of German firms increases compensation, id., perhaps because families use it as a 
mechanism for diverting value to themselves. 
 343. Id. 
 344. OECD.StatExtracts, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2013), http://stats.oecd.org/# 
(last visited May 28, 2013). 
 345. AktG, at § 120, para. 4. The law only requires that the company allows the general meeting 
to vote on the remuneration system of the management board; there is no mandatory requirement. 
 346. Madison Marriage, Hermes Attacks Deutsche Pay Levels, FIN. TIMES, May 27, 2013, at 1. 
 347. Free translation of: “‘Say on pay’ soll für börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften zu einem 
obligatorischen und für den Aufsichtsrat verbindlichen Element ausgebaut werden,” Press Release, Die 
Bundesregierung, Vernunft und Maß bei Managerbezahlung (May 8, 2013) (http://www. 
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2013/05/2013-05-08-kabinett-aktiengesetz.html), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SU9R-QLAJ. 
 348. Press Release, Deutscher Bundestag, SPD will Managereinkünfte Beschränken, DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG (May 16, 2013) (http://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2013_05/2013_273/04.html), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7YXW-28PP. 
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France experienced a similar ownership development. In 1999, the 
companies in the CAC-40 index had a major shareholder with an average 
voting block of 28.1%. Gradually, the ownership structure of the largest 
companies became more dispersed. In 2005, the voting block of the largest 
shareholder dropped to 25.6%, then in 2007, decreased further to 22.2%, 
and most recently was at 21.1% by the end of 2012.
349
 At the same time as 
control blocks were shrinking, the French government, first in 2005, and 
later in 2007, gave the general meeting of shareholders the right to vote on 
the termination payments to be made to an executive board member, as 
well as a vote on whether to permit a corporate board to grant stock 
options. The French also introduced a maximum remuneration cap for 
government-controlled companies. Finally, France introduced a more 
general comply-or-explain vote on the entire compensation package of top 
executives.
350
 
While it would be a mistake to draw too-broad conclusions from the 
experience of these three countries, it does appear that shifts in ownership 
concentration levels, particularly at large listed companies, are an 
important factor behind at least some countries’ adoption of the Say on 
Pay vote. However, even in countries where control shareholders continue 
to reign supreme, Say on Pay may provide control shareholders with an 
additional mechanism to control executive pay, and allow family-run 
companies to claim that they are taking action against negative social 
reactions to “too high” levels of executive pay. “No” votes on Say on Pay 
proposals may also provide minority shareholders with a mechanism for 
expressing their opposition to executive pay practices. 
B. The Effects on Executive Compensation of Increased Stock Ownership 
by Institutional Investors 
A second important factor to consider is the institutionalization of stock 
ownership. Particularly in the U.S. and U.K., institutional share ownership 
has greatly evolved in the past several decades, and as the size of 
institutional investors has grown, they have expanded their portfolios to 
include large quantities of foreign equity securities. In addition, the 
abolishment of national stock ownership restrictions, and the globalization 
of international markets, has provided investors with many new 
 
 
 349. Van der Elst, supra note 339, at 56; Authors’ own research based on companies annual 
reports and websites of these companies (May 2013) (on file with authors). 
 350. See supra Part I.E for further discussion. 
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investment opportunities and a large shift towards international stock.
351 
As a result, in most countries, the shareholder base of large public 
companies has internationalized.  
Table 5 illustrates this shift. In most of the countries covered by the 
table, the share of stock in hands of foreign shareholders more than 
doubled between 1995 and 2010, although the financial crisis of 2008 
partly reversed this trend. In 2010, foreign investors’ ownership share 
ranged from a low of 13% of the shares of American companies to a high 
of 65% of the shares of Dutch companies. This represents a marked 
increase from the number in 1995 (U.S. 6%; Dutch 37%). More generally, 
in countries like France, Sweden, Belgium and the UK, foreign 
shareholders control close to 40% of the shares in more recent years. 
TABLE 5: EVOLUTION OF STOCK IN THE HANDS OF FOREIGN 
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
1995 2000 2005 2007 2010 
Belgium 22.9% 31.1% 36.2% 38.7% N/A 
France 24.9% 38.8% 40.5% 41.1% 38.7% 
Germany 8.2% 12.5% 18.4% 21.3% N/A 
The Netherlands 37.0% N/A 75.0% 71.0% 65.0% 
Sweden 29.6% 39.0% 35.3% 38.0% 37.8% 
UK 16.3% 35.7% 36.3% 40.0% 41.2% 
US 5.7% 8.4% 9.9% 11.0% 13.3% 
Sources for Table 5: Belgium, France, Germany: FESE, Share Ownership Structure in Europe, 2008, 
at 112; France 2010: AFG, Contribution des OPCVM aux fonds propres des entreprises, 2011, at 6; 
The Netherlands: 1995 and 2005: R. Abma, Het aandeelhoudersvergaderingenseizoen 2006: feiten en 
trends, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur, 2006 nr. 5, 169; 2007, FESE; 2010: own calculations 
based on Nyenrode Business Universiteit, Naleving Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code 2012, at 
36; Sweden: SCB, Aktieägarstatistik, 2013 at 24; UK (data 1994, 2004, 2006 instead of 1995, 2005, 
2007): ONS, Ownership of UK Quoted Shares 2010; US: Census table 1201 (data 1994, 2004, 2006 
instead of 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010).  
 
 
 351. For a detailed analysis of the globalization of a number of capital markets, see Maurice 
Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Globalization and Capital Markets, in GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 122–87 (Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor & Jeffrey G. Williamson eds., 2003). 
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To try to examine these effects more closely, we look at German data. 
Many German companies regularly investigate their shareholder base and 
disclose information about the importance and origins of these investors. 
This information is split in a regional breakdown of the ownership of the 
shares and the relative importance of institutional investors and private 
investors (and sometimes other classes). We used these companies’ reports 
to estimate the importance of the institutional investors coming from the 
different regions in the world.
352
 Our data is taken from December 2012 to 
April 2013. According to our survey of 24 DAX companies,
353
 
institutional investors control between 7%
354
 and 93%
355
 of their shares, 
with a mean stake of almost 68%.
356
 Approximately 19% of their stock is 
held by German institutional investors while another 50% is in the hands 
of foreign institutional investors. American and UK institutional investors 
are the most important kind of foreign shareholders with American 
institutions controlling 19% and U.K. firms controlling another 11% of 
these German companies’ shares.357  
For a broader set of Western European countries, data collected by one 
of the authors shows the relative importance of certain types of 
institutional investors: banks, investment funds, and hedge funds/private 
equity funds.
358
 As shown in Table 6, foreign investment funds, private 
equity and hedge funds became important shareholders of Belgian, French 
and German companies and they consolidated their positions in UK 
companies in the last decade.   
 
 
 352. The estimation provides only a first, rough indication: it is assumed that private investors and 
institutional investors are proportionally spread over the different regions.  
 353. The other six companies did not disclose the ownership structure or only disclosed very 
general data. 
 354. VOLKSWAGEN, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 169 (2013).  
 355. Aktionärsstruktur der Gruppe Deutsche Börse, available at http://deutsche-boerse.com/ 
dbg/dispatch/de/kir/dbg_nav/investor_relations/20_The_Share/40_Shareholder_Structure (last visited 
28 May, 2013).  
 356. Majority controlled companies like Beiersdorf and Merck do not disclose detailed 
information of the region of the investors. This explains this high percentage. 
 357. Many companies do not distinguish between US and Canadian institutional investors and 
British and Irish institutional investors.  
 358. Christoph Van der Elst, Are Shareholder Rights Appealing to Foreign Shareholders?, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS HOPT 629–44 (Stefan Grundmann, Brigitte Haar, Hanno Merkt, Peter O. 
Mülbert & Marina Wellenhofer eds., 2010)). 
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TABLE 6: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT FUNDS, 
FOREIGN HEDGE FUNDS, FOREIGN PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND FOREIGN 
BANKS IN FOUR WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
1999 Belgium France Germany UK 
Investment funds N/A 2.31% 2.18% 8.96% 
Hedge funds/private equity N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Banks N/A 1.73% N/A 2.03% 
     2007 Belgium France Germany UK 
Investment funds 7.14% 14.75% 3.77% 8.71% 
Hedge funds/private equity N/A 2.19% 4.56% 0.11% 
Banks 0.48% 1.64% 2.18% 4.95% 
Source: C. Van der Elst, Are Shareholder Rights Appealing to Foreign Shareholders?, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR KLAUS HOPT, 636 (Stefan Grundmann, Brigitte Haar, Hanno Merkt, Peter O. Mülbert & Marina 
Wellenhofer eds., 2010). 
Many of these investors have either a legal duty to vote their shares 
(the institutional investors) or want to actively make use of their voice in 
the investee companies (particularly the activist hedge funds). Institutional 
investors are also likely to have retained a proxy voting advisor to give 
them information or voting advice about the Say on Pay vote to help solve 
the collective action problem. These third-party voting advisors provide 
valuable information about the various items that shareholders vote on as 
well as voting recommendations that may assist the institutional 
shareholders in casting their ballots. To the extent that these third-party 
voting advisors have promulgated corporate governance, or compensation, 
guidelines that shape their voting recommendations, they may have an 
independent additional effect on executive pay levels and composition.
359
 
Foreign institutional investors actively strive for long-term 
performance and encourage the use of pay for performance. As noted in 
Part I, executive performance-based pay is considered an important 
remedy for agency problems and long-term incentive pay for senior 
managers can serve as the best proxy for the alignment of the interests of 
shareholders and management. With the institutions’ support, many 
companies’ executives were provided with performance-based pay, 
including stock options. If remuneration schemes are appropriately 
 
 
 359. Thomas et al., supra note 6.  
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designed to reflect shareholder value, this could result in better 
shareholder returns. 
However, in the period following the financial crisis, it became clear 
that incentive contracting can also be part of the agency problem at 
companies with poor corporate governance practices, as witnessed by 
overly generously designed packages, backdating of stock options and the 
sometimes modest connections between better performance for high pay. 
If shareholders are provided with Say on Pay, they can monitor incentive 
arrangements and remuneration packages by using this mechanism to tell 
management their views on pay issues. Hence, we would expect that 
increased levels of foreign institutional share ownership would lead to 
greater calls for implementation of Say on Pay votes. 
C. Social Intolerance of Income Inequality 
Cultural differences,
360
 or more particularly differences in the level of 
social tolerance for high levels of pay disparities, may exist between 
different countries.
361
 For example, Americans may be more tolerant of 
income inequality that is perceived to arise out of differences in “effort, 
talent or entrepreneurial risk taking,”362 so that investors in the U.S. may 
accept high levels of pay for performance as part of executive pay 
packages.
363
 By contrast, in other countries, a stronger sense of 
egalitarianism could suppress high CEO pay,
364
 and conspicuous displays 
of wealth. Even dispersed-ownership countries like the U.K.
365 
and 
Canada,
366
 which supposedly have adopted the American business 
 
 
 360. Culture can be defined as a society’s shared values, understandings, and assumptions. HELEN 
DERESKY, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: MANAGING ACROSS BORDERS AND CULTURES 15 (3d ed., 
2000). 
 361. Herbert A. Henzler, The New Era of Eurocapitalism, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1992, at 
60. 
 362. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. F640, F667 (2000).  
 363. James Cox, US Success Draws Envy, Protests, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2000, at B1; Michael 
Crawford, Peanuts for Elephants, CAN. BUS., July 1994, at 16; Maria Slade, NZ Executives Pay Third 
World Salaries, INDEP. BUS.WKLY., Sept. 26, 1997, at 23. For anecdotal evidence consistent with this 
view, see David Leonhardt, Executive Pay Drops off the Political Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, 
at Week in Review 5.  
 364. Shirley Fung, How Should We Pay Them?, ACROSS THE BOARD, June 1999, at 36, 39; Tara 
Parker-Pope, Culture Clash: Do US-Style Compensation Plans Make Sense in Other Countries?, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at R7. 
 365. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 362, at F667–68; Martin Van der Weyer, Too Much Cream?, 
INDEP., Aug. 16, 1998, at 16. 
 366. Crawford, supra note 363, at 16.  
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culture,
367
 may be influenced by this factor. Similarly, in Australia, the 
comparatively modest managerial pay arrangements in that country may 
be influenced by concerns about out-of-line pay arrangements.
368
 If culture 
is important, it could lend strength to claims that shareholders need to have 
a vote on executive remuneration arrangements in order to keep pay 
disparities from getting out of touch with social values.  
Even where there are no legal restrictions on pay levels, public opinion 
against high pay levels can be an important force counseling self-restraint. 
In 2007, for instance, it was disclosed that Wendelin Wiedeking, the CEO 
of Porsche AG, had earned approximately $90 million in the previous 
year.
369
 There was a huge public outcry against this pay package.
370
 This 
revelation may have had major policy consequences because of strong 
worker resentment of large pay inequities within society.
371
 This example 
illustrates both the importance of the equalitarian norm and its limitations 
as a check on executive pay. 
In Sweden, a strong egalitarian culture has had an important effect on 
CEO pay.
372
 The Swedish media’s intensive coverage of the 
“unreasonably high” levels of executive pay, and their poor connection, at 
certain companies led the Swedish government to set up the special 
committee that ultimately determined that executives’ remuneration must 
be reasonable in relation to a company’s result and growth.373 The depth of 
public support for this sentiment was shown when the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise, an organization of prominent business members, 
stated in issuing their influential guidelines for Remuneration of Company 
Directors and Senior Management Personnel in 2004 that:  
The debate has chiefly centered on the remuneration of managers of 
the very largest listed companies, where the amounts have been 
considered at times to be excessive and hard to explain. In certain 
cases, completely unreasonable levels of remuneration have been 
 
 
 367. For a discussion of business culture typologies, see DERESKY, supra note 360, at 117–18.  
 368. Slade, supra note 363, at 23; Florence Chong, Salary Secrets: What Companies Have to 
Fear, BUS. REV. WKLY., June 5, 1987, at 50; Julie McBeth, Who Pays the Top Salaries, BUS. REV. 
WKLY., Nov. 25, 1988, at 60.  
 369. Mike Esterl, In Germany, Scandals Tarnish Business Elite, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at A1, 
A14. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id.  
 372. Oxelheim & Randøy, supra, note 335; Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate 
Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY 
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 19 (R. Morck ed., 2005).  
 373. Proposition [Prop.] 2005/06:186 Ersättning till ledande befattningshavare i näringslivet 
[Remuneration of Senior Executives in Business] [government bill], at 27, 40 (Swed.). 
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paid that—justifiably—have been condemned and that have 
undermined confidence in the business community.
374
 
Social resistance to high pay may lead to corporate self-discipline
375
 if 
directors suffer reputational harm when they authorize large pay 
packages.
376
 Pay packages outside of the social norm may be more 
difficult for CEOs to ask for and for directors to approve.
377
 If directors 
and managers fail to show self-control, then social pressure against high 
levels of income inequality may function as a catalyst for legislative 
reform, too. For example, the U.S. tax code was amended in 1992 to 
exclude deductions for managerial pay over $1 million in response to 
public pressure. Similarly, in the U.K. growing disquiet over executive 
pay motivated the U.K.’s Greenbury Committee to tackle executive pay 
and thereby avoid tough statutory regulation.
378
 Pressures from the public 
could well lead to the implementation of Say on Pay legislation for the 
same reasons. 
Cultural values can evolve as well thereby creating scope for change in 
executive pay practices. This certainly seems to have been the case in the 
U.K. Up through the 1970s, top British executives were paid less than 
their counterparts in all other major industrial countries,
379
 perhaps 
because the British managerial culture was very egalitarian and U.K. firms 
reflected this in their pay structures.
380
 However, throughout the 1980s, 
Britain’s political scene shifted dramatically, as its ruling Conservative 
party espoused strong free-market ideologies. Coincident with this 
political and cultural shift, there were dramatic increases in executive 
compensation. The gross pay of CEOs in large, publicly traded U.K. firms 
rose nearly 600% between 1979 and 1994.
381
 By the mid-1990s, British 
 
 
 374. CONFEDERATION OF SWEDISH ENTERPRISE, GUIDANCE FOR REMUNERATION OF COMPANY 
DIRECTORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL 3 (2004). 
 375. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 699 (1997). 
 376. Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Alex Brummer, Failing Brakes on Boardroom Pay, 
GUARDIAN, June 1, 1996, at 38.  
 377. Bebchuk et al., supra note 376. For an example of this process, see Parker-Pope, supra note 
364, at R7.  
 378. CHEFFINS, supra note 375, at 655–56. 
 379. Hugh Parker, The Effective Executive: What is He Worth?, MCKINSEY Q. 22, 27–28 (Winter 
1976).  
 380. CHRISTEL LANE, MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR IN EUROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN 
GERMANY, BRITAIN AND EUROPE 131–32 (1989); Andreas Budde et al., Corporate Goals, Managerial 
Objectives, and Organizational Structures in British and West German Companies, 3 ORG. STUD. 1, 
27 (1982). 
 381. David Goodhart, In Search of Wages that Work, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at 14.  
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CEOs were among the best paid in the world.
382
 This suggests that the 
public’s willingness to implement Say on Pay legislation may change over 
time to reflect social views on the importance of income inequality. 
D. Political Party Enacting the Legislation  
Most of the countries studied in this analysis can be classified as 
“social democracies.” While social democracies value the basic principles 
of capitalism and recognize its strength for producing growth and 
wealth,
383
 they also recognize its tendency to concentrate wealth in the 
hands of the few. Excessive wealth concentration may hinder 
democracy.
384
 At the same time, the social democratic state must not 
unnecessarily obstruct capitalism by substantially curtailing freedom of 
enterprise, or by the expropriation of private property in favor of the 
public at large, thereby jeopardizing the development and freedom of the 
individual.
385
 
Contrary to the beliefs of communists, social democrats recognized that 
capitalism seemed to be able to overcome some of its major weaknesses 
like the exploitation of workers, unemployment and unequal distribution 
of wealth.
386
 However, social democracy believes that capitalism needs a 
visible hand, and opposes too much deregulation.
387
 The most famous 
protagonist of social democracy, Eduard Bernstein “argued that success 
for socialism depended not on the continued and intensifying misery of the 
working class but rather on eliminating that misery.”388 To this aim, 
“capitalism might be necessary to insure an ever-increasing economic pie, 
but it had to be carefully regulated by states so that its negative social and 
political consequences could be kept in check.”389 This regulation should 
balance the interests of private property with the interests of weaker 
parties in society. “Increasingly, social democracy adopted the goal of 
 
 
 382. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need 
Answering, J. ECON. PERSP. Fall 1999, at 145, 146 (1999).  
 383. Sheri Berman, Understanding Social Democracy, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS, FRIEDRICH 
EBERT FOUNDATION 22 (2005). 
 384. FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES, 58 (Tobias Gombert et al. eds., 2009). 
 385. Id. at 59. 
 386. Social Democracy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/EB 
checked/topic/551073/social-democracy (last visited July 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4DR2-
9FLY. 
 387. For an analysis of party politics and ideology, see Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, 
Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade 
Liberalization After Smoot-Hawley, 42 J.L. & ECON. 643 (1999). 
 388. Social Democracy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 386. 
 389. Berman, supra note 383, at 36. 
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state regulation, but not state ownership, of business and industry as 
sufficient to further economic growth and equitable income.”390 
In countries with social democracy, the government takes into account 
distributional considerations of reducing excess wealth accumulation. 
Wealth maximization is only accepted as far as it stimulates growth and 
cannot be interpreted as, or even given the appearance of, exploiting any 
other (corporate) constituents. For many years, this underlying philosophy 
has dampened the level and composition of executive remuneration in 
countries with strong social democratic parties.  
Social democracy conflicts with the typical “Berle and Means” 
corporation. In these firms, diffuse shareholders prefer shareholder wealth 
maximization and managers are encouraged to put shareholders’ interests 
first. In corporations with dispersed ownership, managers must be made 
more loyal to shareholders. The corporate governance mechanisms that 
serve that goal are incentivizing compensation, hostile takeovers and 
transparent accounting.
391
 These instruments have been underdeveloped in 
the continental Western European social democracies historically.  
Take Germany as an example. In Germany, it was not until 1998 that 
the issuance of share options was legally facilitated. Hostile takeovers 
were highly exceptional until 2000
392
 with the acquisition of Mannesmann 
by Vodafone and with 85% of the companies having a block-holder 
owning more than 25% of the shares.
393
 Finally, the German accounting 
system diverged significantly from the US counterpart by stressing low 
earning volatility.
394
  
Since 2000, incentive compensation, hostile takeovers and transparent 
accounting have become more common in most European countries. 
Corporate managers are heavily incentivized using stock options, the 
European Takeover Directive
395
 has harmonized large parts of the national 
takeover procedures including hostile takeover bids, and the International 
 
 
 390. Social Democracy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 386. 
 391. Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 539, 553–60 (2000). 
 392. Mayer and Franks reported three hostile bids. Julian R. Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership 
and Control of German Corporations (Sept. 25, 2000) (Econ. Soc. Research Council, unpublished 
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=247501 and http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247501. 
 393. Id. 
 394. For an analysis of the differences in reporting with an application of the DaimlerChrysler 
case, see Ray Ball, Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting at Daimler-Benz 
(DaimlerChrysler) AG: From a “Stakeholder” toward a “Shareholder Value” Model, in THE 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF ACCOUNTING: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH TRENDS, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 32–57 (Christian Leuz, Dieter Pfaff & Anthony Hopwood eds., 2004). 
 395. Directive 2004/25 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC).  
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Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been introduced for the 
consolidated accounts of stock exchange listed companies.
396
 These 
developments went hand-in-hand with the globalization of the stock 
exchanges and the shift towards institutional investors’ ownership.397  
Continental European pay practices have moved toward U.S.-style 
practices. Since 2006, German listed companies must disclose the 
remuneration package of the individual management board members,
398
 
thereby providing employees, politicians and society easy access to 
information about the remuneration packages of board members of large 
German companies. The financial press regularly reports (indignantly) on 
the pay packages of top managers.
399
 The number of public corporations 
with dispersed ownership has increased and the American-style 
shareholder-wealth-maximization norm has become more common.  
At the same time, income inequality has increased in many Western 
European countries.
400
 This conflicts with the basic principles of wealth 
distribution in social democracies. A social democratic response was 
needed, but straightforward mandatory executive pay caps are 
unacceptable because they conflict with the idea of private property in a 
democracy and smack of communism. A politically acceptable alternative 
might be to have shareholders of the locally based firms vote on executive 
remuneration, which will have less dramatic effects on managers’ pay than 
direct government regulation of compensation levels. The result was Say 
on Pay, a “democratic” voting system for executive pay packages and/or 
policies. 
These policies were overwhelmingly instituted by social democratic 
parties. This is illustrated below in Table 7, which shows the political 
parties that initiated the different kinds of “say on pay” in each of the five 
Continental European countries in our analysis. The approval of the 
remuneration system and remuneration report in the U.K. (2002), 
 
 
 396. Regulation 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the 
Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC). 
 397. See supra Part II.D for further discussion. 
 398. Gesetzes über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen [Vorstandsvergütungs-
Offenlegungsgesetz—VorstOG] [Law about the Disclosure of the Remuneration of the Management 
Board], Aug. 3, 2005, GERMAN OFFICIAL JOURNAL [BGBL.] Aug. 10 2005, at 2267. 
 399. See, e.g., Chris Bryant, VW Adds Impetus to Executive Pay Debate, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2012, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47c96cd6-6c25-11e1-8c9d-00144feab49a. 
html#axzz2YO3VeIT8 (last visited July 5, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9VB5-U27G. 
 400. According to OECD data, the Gini-coefficient increased in Germany from 0.264 in 2000 to 
0.286 in 2010. The Gini-coefficient is “a standard measure of income inequality that ranges from 0 
(when everybody has identical incomes) to 1 (when all income goes to only one person).” OECD, An 
Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings, in DIVIDED WE 
STAND: WHY INEQUALITY KEEPS RISING 21, 22 (2011). 
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Germany (2009) and Belgium (2010) was initiated and approved by Social 
Democrats. In Germany, the recent unsuccessful push for a mandatory 
“Say on Pay” vote was initiated by the Christian Democrats preventing 
more harsh proposals of the social democrats. In France, the approval rules 
for termination agreements stem from the more liberal government in 
2005 and 2007 but these approval rights are not envisaging mandatory Say 
on Pay. Only in the Netherlands was the Say on Pay system initiated by a 
Christian Democratic member of Parliament and not by the Social 
Democrats. In this regard, we note that the Christian Democrats are in 
many European countries in the middle of the political spectrum, 
providing legal initiatives that are welcomed by more liberal, or more 
socialist parties, depending on the topic and political coalitions at the 
moment of launching the initiative. Overall, we conclude that the Social 
Democrats and other left wing parties are keener to issue Say on Pay 
regulations. 
TABLE 7: POLITICAL “WING” INTRODUCING “SAY ON PAY” LAWS 
 Date Topic Type of Say 
on Pay  
Introduced Who Political party 
Belgium April 6, 
2010 
Remuneration 
report 
Advisory 
vote 
December 
2009 
Government Liberals, 
Christian 
Democrats, 
French speaking 
socialists 
Netherlands July 9, 
2004 
Remuneration 
policy 
Mandatory May 16, 
2003 (via 
amendment) 
Jan De Vries 
Blok Geskes 
Christian 
Democrats 
UK July 25, 
2002 
The Directors’ 
Remuneration 
Report 
Regulations 
2002 
Advisory 
vote 
 Government  Labour 
France July 26, 
2005 
Termination 
agreements 
Mandatory April 13, 
2005 
T. Breton 
(government) 
Center right 
political party 
France August 1, 
2007 
Disclosure 
criteria 
termination agr.  
 June 29, 
2007 
government  Center right 
political party 
Germany July 31, 
2009 
Remuneration 
system 
Advisory 
vote 
March 17, 
2009 
SPD/CDU Socialists, 
Christian 
Democrats 
Germany Pending Remuneration 
system 
Mandatory 
voting 
June 26, 
2013 
CDU/FDP* Christian 
Democrats, 
liberals 
*overruling the far-reaching proposals of the socialists    
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E. State Ownership of Major Enterprises  
Executive remuneration levels at companies where the government is a 
major shareholder in large public companies (State Owned Enterprises or 
“SOEs”) are a politically sensitive topic in many countries. While different 
countries have deployed different approaches, in 2005, the OECD issued a 
corporate governance code for state owned entities.
401
 In it, the OECD 
emphasized the role of the government as shareholders in setting the 
appropriate remuneration policies. The remuneration scheme of directors 
of SOEs must “foster the long term interest of the company and can attract 
and motivate qualified professionals.”402 The Code requires the disclosure 
of the remuneration policy as well as the disclosure of the remuneration 
levels of board members and key executives on an individual basis. The 
remuneration disclosure should include the termination and retirement 
provisions.  
While the OECD Code is useful, it does not solve many of the 
problems facing governments in deciding what to pay SOE executives. 
Governments in countries with many SOEs have generally followed one 
of two options: direct regulation of the remuneration package of directors 
and/or top managers; or indirect regulation using their voting power and 
some kind of “say on pay.” One example of direct regulation is the French 
cap on the total remuneration of executive directors of SOEs. The French 
government issued a decree in July 2012 to set the maximum remuneration 
of €450,000.403 This level was said to approximate twenty times the 
average pay package of the lowest-paid workers at French SOEs.
404
 While 
previously the SOEs’ boards of directors determined the remuneration, 
subject to approval by two government ministers, the new rules forbid the 
Ministers from approving remuneration packages that exceed the 
maximum threshold.  
This type of cap has indirect effects on other corporations as well. If 
there are no checks on pay levels at private sector firms, then the cap on 
remuneration for publicly listed SOEs will result in a large gap between 
 
 
 401. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 9 
(2005). 
 402. Id. at 13. 
 403. Loi 2012-915 du 26 juillet 2012 relatif au contrôle de l’Etat sur les rémunérations des 
dirigeants d’entreprises publiques [Law 2012-915 of July 26, 2012 on the Government Control of the 
Remuneration of the Directors of Government Controlled Companies], J.O., July 26, 2012, p. 12283. 
 404. See Les Rémunérations des Patrons d’entreprises Publiques Plafonnées à 450 000 €, 
LEGIPOLE DROIT SOCIAL, http://www.droit-social-legipole.fr/les-remunerations-des-patrons-dentreprises-
publiques-plafonnees-a-450-000-e (last visited July 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/827E-V37K. 
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the two sectors’ executive compensation levels. This in turn will put 
pressure on the government to institute an indirect form of regulation by 
enlisting shareholders as some kind of monitors of “Say on Pay” votes on 
executive remuneration. As we discussed in Part I.E above, this appears to 
be what is happening in France today.  
Belgium is a good example of a country where the government has 
relied on indirect regulation of SOE executive compensation via the 
introduction of an advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration report in 
2010. This vote is applicable to both the “autonomous government 
undertakings” (SOEs) as well as the listed entities. This system provides 
more flexibility, particularly when new developments occur such as those 
arising at Belgacom, the largest listed Belgian SOE illustrates. In that case, 
only days before the general meeting of shareholders, the minister in 
charge opined that the remuneration of the top management of the 
company was too generous and the government withheld its vote at the 
AGM.
405
 Consequently, the majority of the minority shareholders rejected 
the remuneration report leading the board of directors to reassess the 
remuneration policy of the company.  
However, mandatory Say on Pay votes must be employed carefully by 
governments at SOEs, as the Swedish TeliaSonera case illustrates. There, 
the Swedish government’s rejection of the company’s variable 
remuneration based on share options caused significant renegotiation costs 
for all executive management contracts.
406
 Ultimately, shareholders bore 
these additional costs. 
III. PREDICTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SAY ON PAY  
Having examined the different legal regimes that have been used to 
implement Say on Pay in many countries around the world, and analyzed 
the common factors that may have led to its creation in those countries, in 
this last Part we turn to the implications of these new rules for future of 
executive compensation, corporate governance, and legal doctrine. We see 
several areas where Say on Pay is likely to have an impact on these three 
important topics. 
Many supporters of Say on Pay hoped that it would have a strong effect 
on absolute executive compensation levels, or their rate of growth.
407
 The 
 
 
 405. See supra Part I.D.2 for further discussion.  
 406. Id. 
 407. Thomas et al., supra note 6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] SAY ON PAY AROUND THE WORLD 729 
 
 
 
 
U.S. experience suggests that their aspirations have not been realized.
408
 
Two studies have found that Say on Pay in 2011 had little or no impact on 
executive compensation levels.
409
 In the U.S., this trend has continued into 
the early part of the 2013 proxy season.
410
 Research on the U.K. has also 
found that overall CEO pay levels do not seem to have changed as a result 
of Say on Pay vote.
411
 
However, a recent study of the international experience suggests 
otherwise. Correa and Lel use a large cross-country sample from thirty-
nine countries and find that Say on Pay laws are associated with a lower 
level of CEO compensation.
412
 They further find that the companies that 
are most affected are ones with poor performance. This is consistent with 
U.S. evidence that poor performance and high levels of pay lead third-
party voting advisors to issue negative voting recommendations on their 
Say on Pay proposals because the companies deviate far from the average 
levels of all companies. Thus, abnormal levels of high pay coupled with 
relative bad performance trigger high levels of no votes.
413
  
If these results are supported, and public pressure to rein in executive 
pay levels continues to mount, then we believe that a policy move to 
implement binding shareholder votes in Say on Pay legal regimes is 
plausible. The logic for such a move might run as follows: shareholders’ 
concerns about directors being captured by management in dispersed-
ownership systems, or public pressure to keep pay inequities limited, 
coupled with the failure to rein in increasing levels of executive 
compensation, means that legal rules need to increase the power of the 
AGM to further determine compensation policy, and define the individual 
packages for executives through their influence with the board’s 
 
 
 408. Jesse Eisinger, In Shareholder Say-on-Pay Votes, Whispers, Not Shouts, N.Y. TIMES, June 
27, 2013, at B5. 
 409. Cunat et al., supra note 39, at 5; Iliev & Vitanova, supra note 49 at 3. Iliev and Vitanova 
state: “We find that the Say-on-Pay vote had no effect on the level or the composition of CEO pay. We 
document no change in the ratio of equity and cash compensation as a fraction of total CEO pay, 
indicating that the vote had no detectable effect on the CEO compensation contract.” Id. 
 410. Eisinger, supra note 408, at B5 (reporting that executive pay levels continue to rise steadily 
even after the implementation of Say on Pay); see also Gretchen Morgenson, That Unstoppable Climb 
in CEO Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at B1 (reporting that CEOs received a 16% median pay 
increase in 2012 over 2011 pay levels). 
 411. Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholders Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report 
legislation: Say on Pay in the UK, 18 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 296 (2010) (finding no change in 
the overall level of executive pay or its rate of growth subsequent to Say on Pay votes); see also Ferri 
& Maber, supra note 3, at 559 (U.K.) (finding that firms did adjust contractual features and increase 
sensitivity to pay for performance in response to negative vote outcomes). 
 412. Correa & Lel, supra note 5, at 2. 
 413. Thomas et al., supra note 6. 
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remuneration committees. Correa and Lel find that the introduction of Say 
on Pay results in lower internal pay inequities within firms as well as 
higher firm value.
414
 Most managers and directors will prefer this 
“internal” corporate solution to having direct regulation of executive 
compensation levels, such as that experienced in the financial sector 
during and after the financial crisis. The recent experiences in the U.K., 
Australia, the new European Union proposals and Switzerland, suggest 
that this could be a wave of the future. 
We are pessimistic that Say on Pay alone will accomplish this result. 
To see why, it is important to remember that most companies use a 
benchmarking process to set their executive compensation levels: they 
select a group of “comparable” companies from their industry, calculate 
the median level of pay at those firms, and then tie pay to that median. If 
we remember that shareholders only vote in large numbers against the 
outliers in Say on Pay votes, then companies that benchmark their pay 
levels to the median level of firms within their industry sector are unlikely 
to fail their Say on Pay votes. Since the practice of benchmarking is 
widely acknowledged to “ratchet up” the level of executive compensation, 
we should not expect the growth of executive pay levels to slow until an 
alternative method of setting pay is adopted.
415
 In other words, even 
binding Say on Pay by itself is unlikely to stop the growth of executive 
compensation.
416
 
But that does not mean that Say on Pay has not had an important effect 
on corporate governance practices. The existing evidence strongly 
suggests that companies that experience significant levels of shareholder 
opposition against their Say on Pay proposals enhance the level of 
engagement between directors and shareholders.
417
 This is most apparent 
in the dispersed-ownership companies where management now engages in 
much greater outreach to shareholders over compensation issues.
418
 
Whereas previously the shareholders were only contacted concerning 
votes on major transactions like mergers and acquisitions, or contested 
 
 
 414. Correa & Lel, supra note 5, at 2. 
 415. Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and 
Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487 (2013); John Bizjak, Michael 
Lemmon & Thanh Nguyen, Are All CEOs Above Average? An Empirical Analysis of Compensation 
Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538 (2011). 
 416. There is an important caveat to this conclusion though. If boards face other sanctions for 
failing their Say on Pay votes, such as those imposed in Australia’s two-strike system discussed in Part 
I.C above, then they may be sufficiently deterred by the prospect of those consequences that they will 
adopt a different pay setting system. 
 417. Thomas et al., supra note 6. 
 418. Id. 
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board elections, shareholders are now engaged about pay packages. This 
represents a significant change in prior corporate governance practices that 
shows shareholders have greater input at many companies on pay issues. 
Yet, more shareholder engagement without substantive changes to pay 
practices may be unsatisfying in specific situations where there is intense 
pressure to rein in executive pay levels. One example where such 
regulations have been adopted in recent years is the financial sector in the 
EU, and at least temporarily after the TARP legislation in the U.S., applied 
to bailout recipients. Another example is at SOEs in certain countries, such 
as France.
419
 These hard-law regimes introduce pay caps, mandate certain 
forms of pay and directly involve governments in the boardroom on pay 
issues. However, we find it unlikely that these intrusive types of hard-law 
regulations would be introduced for other types of companies, curbing 
shareholder power and encumbering management.  
 
 
 419. France also enacted high taxes on executive pay exceeding €1 million per year. Loi 2013-
1278 du 29 décembre 2013 de finances pour 2014 [Law 2013-1278 of December 29, 2013 on the 
Financing of 2014], J.O., Dec. 30, 2013, p. 21829, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich 
Texte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028399511&categorieLien=id; French ‘Millionaire Tax’ Cleared, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), at B2 (reporting that the French Constitutional Council gave the go ahead 
to the government’s proposed 75% tax on companies awarding more than €1 million to their 
executives). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
